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SEEING THE GOOD AND BAD IN CULTURE: 
AN EXPLORATION OF THE CONSTRUCT OF CULTURAL COMPLEXITY 
This research aimed to explore cultural complexity, a novel construct defined as variability in the 
level of agreement between one’s personal beliefs and the perceived important norms in one’s 
culture. Simply put, individuals who exhibit high levels of cultural complexity tend to notice 
both positive and negative aspects of their culture. Although previous research in the psychology 
of culture has examined the overall degree of fit between one’s personal beliefs and perceived 
cultural norms, little is known about whether cultural complexity is a meaningful construct. In 
three studies, I demonstrated the relevance of cultural complexity by examining the role it plays 
in beliefs about culture (Study 1), attitudes towards a racial ingroup and outgroup (Study 2), and 
patterns of information processing (Study 3). Study 1 mapped the nomological network of 
cultural complexity: Mediation analyses were used to identify individual difference correlates of 
cultural complexity and demonstrate that cultural complexity was associated with variables 
conducive to positive intergroup contact (e.g., cultural humility). Study 2 was an experimental 
study that provided evidence suggesting that cultural complexity attenuated intergroup bias, 
especially outgroup derogation, when people’s group identity was threatened. Study 3 further 
showed that cultural complexity facilitated a tendency to consider even-handed information 
when the interest of one’s cultural in-group was at stake. Results from these three studies with 
different research designs lend support to the validity of cultural complexity and have important 
implications for the conceptualization of individuals’ interactions with their culture. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Consider the following account of culture taken from a Taiwanese student: “Taiwanese 
culture to me is hard to describe.  I think people in Taiwan are under undue pressure to live up to 
a strict set of societal expectations, such as getting married and buying a house by a certain age.  
There are other bad customs practiced in Taiwan, like the traditional funeral proceedings that are 
just noisy and formalism.  However, showing respect to teachers and other Confucius ideas are 
something that I really appreciate.”  This excerpt contains both positive and negative evaluations 
of the perceived cultural norms in Taiwan.  How would one describe this person’s 
conceptualization of his or her culture?  In addition, what are the roles that this inconsistent 
evaluative profile of understanding culture plays in people’s culturally relevant psychological 
processes?  To address these questions, I introduce in this dissertation a novel construct—
cultural complexity, defined as a proclivity to think of one’s culture as composed of both 
desirable and undesirable parts.  An example will be a person who pays equal attention to both a 
cultural norm he or she thinks highly of and another cultural norm perceived as undesirable.  I 
first review the main paradigms in the psychology of culture, focusing on how cultural is 
conceptualized and measured in each approach.  The limited utility of these prior paradigms in 
providing an adequate account for cultural complexity will be delineated.  I then define cultural 
complexity, relate it to other constructs in the literature, and review preliminary evidence for the 
central premise of cultural complexity, namely that individuals who are inclined to notice both 
positive and negative aspects of their culture have a unique (positive) way of relating to culture.  
I conclude with a discussion on methodology, arguing that the subjective norms approach serves 
as an appropriate basis from which a measure of cultural complexity can be developed.  Finally, 
an overview of the three studies and predictions are provided. 
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Different Paradigms in the Cultural Psychological Study 
As literature documenting national and ethnic group differences in human psychological 
functioning has burgeoned in the past three decades, researchers are increasingly interested in the 
underlying mechanisms that explain these differences.  Various experimental manipulation 
techniques have been employed to directly test the effects of theorized active cultural ingredients 
(Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Oyserman & Lee, 2008).  Generally speaking, the 
paradigm in cultural research in psychology has shifted from a descriptive science of group 
differences to a science of cultural processes, with a focus on the malleable nature of culture 
(Leung, Chiu, & Hong, 2011; Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006; Y. J. Wong, Wang, & Maffini, 2014; Y. 
J. Wong, Wang, & Farmer, in press). 
The Group Entity Paradigm  
The first paradigm of research is rooted in an entity conception of culture (Adams & 
Markus, 2004).  In other words, culture is seen as a stable system of lay theories, beliefs, and 
norms confined within the boundary of various types of readily identifiable groups (e.g., race, 
ethnicity, nation; Adams & Markus, 2004; Morris, Chiu, & Liu, 2015).  This conceptualization 
implies a unidirectional channel of culture influences where people absorb cultural theories in a 
fax-like manner (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1993), so whatever elements are characteristic of a 
culture, their impacts on human behaviors are believed to be steady, constant, and general 
(DiMaggio, 1997; Morris et al., 2015).  Following this culture-as-categories perspective, studies 
under this paradigm seek to contrast these demarcated human groups on cognitive, behavioral, or 
emotional variables of interest, and then attribute the differences to cultural influences (Y. J. 
Wong et al., 2014).  In terms of methodology, culture is often not measured but assumed.  For 
example, in a cross-cultural research comparing American and Chinese participants, culture will 
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be operationalized as being a member in either country, which is then treated as discrete 
categories in subsequent analyses (Hermans & Kempen, 1998).  Although this paradigm is 
fruitful in critiquing the generality of psychological principles and delineating the boundaries of 
theories developed primarily in the US with monocultural samples, it has been challenged for 
equating (social, geographical, ethnic) groups with cultures and assuming the homogeneity of 
cultural groups (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006; Y. J. Wong et al., 2014). 
Redirecting our attention back to the description of culture given by the Taiwanese 
student, readers might have noticed at least two limitations in the explanatory utility of the entity 
paradigm.  First, the questionable assumption of culture’s sweeping influence on all people in a 
cultural group precludes the proposition that people can articulate the existence of certain 
cultural norms, yet hold personal judgments that may or may not align with these norms (Way et 
al., 2014; Y. J. Wong, Ho, Wang, & Fisher, 2016).  Empirical studies have discovered an 
imperfect correlation between personal values and beliefs and those perceived to be widespread 
in one’s culture (Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007).  Additionally, negative correlations between 
personal beliefs and cultural practices have also been reported (Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2010).  
Second, the assumption of groups with rigid boundaries neglects the fact that culture is 
continuously evolving.  Some independent, “American” cultural values could today be perceived 
as equally widespread in China and America (e.g., self-reliance), and vice versa for some 
collectivistic, “Chinese” values (e.g., majority rule; Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007).  Therefore, it 
is conceivable that for some people, cultural complexity will only be observed when they are 
given the latitude to come up with whatever aspects of culture they consider important.  I will 
elaborate on this issue in the latter section on measuring cultural complexity. 
The Individual Differences Paradigm 
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Rather than using groups as proxies for culture, researchers in the individual differences 
paradigm have made an attempt to identify meaningful dimensions of culture against which 
countries and individuals can be mapped onto (Y. J. Wong et al., 2014).  Such dimensions not 
only serve as a framework to explain the sources that lead to observed cultural variability in the 
similarities and differences in behavior, but also further facilitate the development of cultural 
theories that link cultural level phenomena to individual level psychological processes (Hofstede, 
1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006; Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Y. J. Wong 
et al., 2014).  For example, a highly influential set of cultural dimensions is proposed by 
Hofstede (1980, 2001), where five dimensions are eventually identified as critical in explaining 
cultural variability; Markus and Kitayama (1991), on the other hand, stimulated the advance of 
this paradigm by linking the cultural level dimension of individualism-collectivism to the 
individual level of self (i.e., independent and interdependent self-construal).   
Research within this paradigm typically involves measuring these identified dimensions 
through self-report Likert-type scales, so it provides a direct assessment on the cultural cause.  
Moreover, the homogeneous group assumption is also rejected as within-group variability 
inevitably emerges (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006; Y. J. Wong et al., 2014).  This methodology has 
spurred a rapid growth in literature across different disciplines.  In counseling psychology, for 
instance, the advent of studies on adherence to cultural values (Kim, Atkinson, & Yang, 1999; 
Kim, Soliz, Orellana, & Alamilla, 2009) advances our understanding of the interplay between 
culture and mental health outcomes. 
Despite the immense contributions from the individual differences paradigm, culture is 
still conceptualized as mental lenses through which its members interpret the world.  These 
“lenses” are believed to be something that people cannot put aside.  In other words, cultural 
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values are like personality traits, exerting static influence across domains of people’s lives 
(Morris et al., 2015; Y. J. Wong et al., 2014).  This premise is problematic because people are 
not only capable of acquiring expertise in more than one culture, but also able to adjust their 
thoughts and behaviors according to the contexts (Hong & Chiu, 2001). 
Turn the focus back to the free description of Taiwanese culture again.  First, the most 
apparent challenge in trying to explain cultural complexity is the fact that this paradigm is 
concerned with the overall degree to which a person internalized cultural theories, not the 
variability of these beliefs.  For instance, researchers can assess individualism-collectivism using 
a Likert-type scale and correlate its mean scores with individual outcomes, behaviors, and 
attitudes (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002).  Variation (as exemplified by the standard 
deviation of such scores) is simply not a part of the picture.  Cultural complexity, in essence, 
involves variability in one’s views of culture.  The second challenge pertains to the degree of fit 
between the meaningful dimensions put forth by researchers and the dimensions personally 
relevant to the participants.  Matsumoto and Yoo (2006) have made similar comment when 
reviewing existing theoretical models for explaining cultural differences.  Specifically, they 
advocate for the inclusion of multiple cultural dimensions to afford a nuanced account for ways 
in which subjective culture shapes behavior.  But the question remains—how many is enough 
and what should be included.   
The Polyculturalist Paradigm 
The third paradigm distinguishes itself from the previous two in its fundamentally 
different view on culture, namely, culture as partial and plural as opposed to categorical (Morris 
et al., 2015).  In particular, culture is conceptualized as an open, evolving system consisting of a 
set of loosely connected beliefs and practices that are shared imperfectly among a group of 
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people across generations (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010).  The words 
open and evolving denote the first feature of culture that emphasizes the dynamic nature of 
culture.  Culture can change as a result of intercultural contact.  The second feature pertains to 
the heterogeneity within a culture group, which invites partiality and plurality.  This perspective 
acknowledges individuals’ agency in their interaction with cultures—from the collective-level 
system of cultural tools, members select a small subset according to needs and experiences 
(Morris et al., 2015).  That is, not every member of a cultural group shares the same 
understanding of culture, and behavioral influence of culture is intermittent and conditional on 
various contexts (Hong & Mallorie, 2004).  Last, this conception explicitly rejects the reified 
notion of culture, highlighting the fact that people can engage with some characteristics of their 
primary culture as well as some of another culture. 
Two notable threads of contemporary cultural psychological research fit this paradigm.  
Research informed by the dynamic constructivist approach involves the experimental 
manipulation of the saliency of cultural knowledge, usually through exposing people to cultural 
icons.  In such research, people from the same cultural group have been shown to display 
different cognitive and behavioral patterns depending on the cultural primes they received (Hong 
et al., 2000; R. Y. M. Wong & Hong, 2005).  Studies that foreground the power of individuals’ 
assumptions of values, beliefs, and behaviors widely endorsed in their cultures in explaining 
cross cultural differences is another example.  This line of inquiry typically includes assessments 
(in most cases, self-report Likert-type measures) of people’s knowledge of the norms of one or 
more cultures as well as their own personal norms and values.  Researchers then examine how 
perceived cultural norms, personal norms, and the degree of fit between the two contribute to 
behavioral, cognitive, attitudinal, and mental health outcomes (Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 
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2009; Wan, Chiu, Peng, & Tam, 2007; Wan, Torelli, & Chiu, 2010; Y. J. Wong et al., 2016; Zou 
et al., 2009). 
Applying this paradigm to cultural complexity, some strengths could be noted.  First, 
cultural complexity emphasizes a person’s subjective reflections on culture.  Therefore, if we ask 
two Taiwanese individuals to provide open-ended descriptions of Taiwanese culture, the content 
of both responses is likely to be different.  The explicit emphasis on cultural influences as partial 
and plural is critical in the polyculturalist paradigm because it not only acknowledges within 
group differences, but also allows a place for subjectivity.  Second, the metaphor of cultural 
elements as a collection of “apps” that people can select and download (Morris et al., 2015) 
implies that people can also write reviews for the “apps.”  Again, this is consistent with what 
cultural complexity requires—the ability to evaluate important elements of one’s culture.  
However, research in this paradigm has a lopsided focus on the degree to which one’s personal 
values align with one’s perceptions of the most important cultural norms in one’s culture (e.g., 
Wan, Chiu, Peng, et al., 2007).  In contrast, the literature is silent on the variability of this 
alignment—the defining feature of cultural complexity. 
Conceptualization of Cultural Complexity 
To address limitations in existing paradigms of culture, I introduce the concept of cultural 
complexity.  Cultural complexity is defined as the tendency to hold both positive and negative 
evaluations of the social norms perceived to be important in one’s culture.  Culture contains 
myriad tangible and symbolic aspects, including practices, ideas, values, constitutive rules, 
artifacts and so on (Fiske, 2002).  However, I focus only on cultural norms because they 
illuminate culturally relevant psychological processes above and beyond the contribution of 
individual values and beliefs (Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 2015; Zou & Leung, 2015).  In the 
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counseling psychology literature, norms (in their broad sense) have also been shown to be related 
to relevant health outcomes, such as intention to seek professional help (Vogel, Heimerdinger-
Edwards, Hammer, & Hubbard, 2011), engagement in health risk behavior (Hamilton & 
Mahalik, 2009), and life satisfaction (Y. J. Wong et al., 2016).  In the following sections, I first 
elaborate on two characteristics of cultural complexity (i.e., variability and subjectivity), 
followed by a discussion aiming at disentangling cultural complexity from other similar 
constructs, including attitudinal ambivalence, integrative complexity, and intersubjective cultural 
representation. 
Characteristics of Cultural Complexity 
Variability.  Variation in one’s response pattern is an essential feature of cultural 
complexity.  Psychological studies of culture, regardless of paradigms, have an exclusive focus 
on mean score, whether they be group mean scores (e.g., comparing nation mean score 
differences on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions; Hofstede, 1983), individual mean scores (e.g., 
averaging individuals’ scores on measures of self-construal; Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000), or 
mean scores of people’s perception of cultural members’ cultural orientation (Zou et al., 2009).  
The neglect of variation in cultural variables is surprising as there is empirical evidence as well 
as theoretical models postulating that individuals vary in their understanding of and levels of 
agreement with cultural norms (Fischer et al., 2009; Leung & Cohen, 2011; Y. J. Wong et al., 
2016).  A narrow focus on mean scores treats variability as statistical noise rather than as a 
meaningful cultural construct.  
Capitalizing on variation is not a novel practice in psychology.  Fischer et al. (2009) 
found that cultural members did not highly agree with one another in their perception of the 
sharedness of individualism and collectivism.  They suggested that the variance itself may be a 
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useful index of cultural differences on the dimension of tightness-looseness.  Another intellectual 
precursor of cultural complexity comes from personality psychology research that examines two 
forms of intraindivdual variance—variability in item scores of a questionnaire or fluctuations 
across time and situations (Eid & Diener, 1999; Timmermans, Van Mechelen, & Kuppens, 
2010).  Lastly, some scholars utilize variability to operationalize constructs pertaining to 
flexibility.  For instance, Wiggins and Holzmuller (1981) conceptualized interpersonal flexibility 
as variability across one’s profile of 16 interpersonal traits (e.g., dominance, introversion).  
Cheng (2001) defined cognitive flexibility, a process in coping flexibility, as the variability in 
one’s perception concerning the extent to which one has control over stressful situations. 
In sum, cultural complexity reflects intraindividual variation in people’s level of 
endorsement of cultural norms.  A profile containing strong agreement with some norms and 
disagreement with other norms indicates high cultural complexity.  I surmise that cultural 
complexity would provide unique information beyond mean level of agreement with cultural 
norms. 
Subjectivity.  The second feature of cultural complexity is its explicit emphasis on 
subjectivity, which is influenced by social constructivist viewpoints on culture (Morris & Liu, 
2015; Weber & Morris, 2010; Y. J. Wong et al., 2016; Y. J. Wong et al., 2013).  Specifically, 
individuals do not passively absorb dominant cultural discourses and act mindlessly according to 
these internalized cultural scripts.  Instead, people are active agents interacting with the 
widespread cultural theories (recall the “app” metaphor), a meaning making process from which 
they construct idiosyncratic understanding of their culture (Chiu et al., 2010; Y. J. Wong et al., 
2016).  To illustrate, two Americans can come up with very different answers when asked about 
the most important cultural norms concerning Americans.  One person could report “getting 
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married and having children,” whereas the other may say “voting and going to church.” 
Because of the heterogeneity in individuals’ cultural representation, I argue that cultural 
complexity is best measured by a methodology that allows research participants the latitude to 
provide open-ended responses instead of responding to a predetermined set of norms provided by 
researchers (Y. J. Wong et al., 2016), a point I will elaborate on in the next section.   
Contrast with Related Constructs 
Attitudinal ambivalence and cultural complexity.  At first glance, cultural complexity 
may be similar to attitudinal ambivalence, which refers to “the extent to which one’s reactions to 
an attitude object are evaluatively mixed in that both positive (favorable) and negative 
(unfavorable) elements are included” (Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995, p. 460).  
Indeed, both constructs involve discrepant evaluations associated with the very same object, 
although cultural complexity applies the notion of discrepant evaluations specifically to culture.  
However, a close examination of these two constructs reveals that there are at least two 
important differences.  First, research in attitudinal ambivalence almost unanimously links 
conflicting evaluations to unpleasant feelings when both conflicting cognitions are made 
accessible (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002).  The relationship is also found for 
implicit ambivalence where people hold value-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes toward 
the same object (Rydell & Durso, 2012).  However, unlike attitudinal ambivalence, cultural 
complexity is presumed to be a manifestation of critical reflections on cultural beliefs, values, 
and norms with a balanced perspective, which is not likely to beget negative psychological 
states.  Indirect evidence can be gleaned from literature on integrative complexity, the concept 
used to describe people’s cognitive representation about certain issues that encompasses multiple 
competing perspectives (differentiation) and conceptual connections among these elements 
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(integration; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Tetlock, 1986).  Evidence shows that people were 
motivated to engage in this effortful way of information processing when they interpret an issue 
involving a tradeoff between values of high personal importance (Tetlock, 1986).  Conflicting 
evaluations on important norms in one’s cultural group could mirror such a state, motivating an 
individual to form a complex structure without aversive feelings. 
The second major distinction pertains to a potential antecedent of the two constructs, 
need for cognition, referring to a propensity to gain satisfaction from cognitive tasks.  For 
attitudinal ambivalence, Thompson and Zanna (1995) discovered that people high in need for 
cognition were less likely to be ambivalent than people low in need for cognition.  On the other 
hand, although no empirical support is available, it makes conceptual sense that need for 
cognition will be positively associated with cultural complexity.  In particular, because cultural 
complexity is characterized by variability in appraisals, it could be cognitively taxing.  A person 
who gains pleasure by thinking (high need for cognition) is therefore presumed to have higher 
levels of cultural complexity.  Taken together, cultural complexity is unlikely to induce 
unpleasant feelings and is hypothetically correlated positively with need for cognition, thus 
distinguishing itself from attitudinal ambivalence. 
Integrative complexity and cultural complexity.  Besides attitudinal ambivalence, it is 
also worthy of drawing a distinction between cultural complexity and the aforementioned 
integrative complexity, a construct that was first introduced to describe a cognitive style that has 
been recently applied to research on biculturalism (Tadmor, Galinsky, & Maddux, 2012; Tadmor 
& Tetlock, 2006; Tadmor, Tetlock, & Peng, 2009). 
To reiterate, integrative complexity consists of two cognitive structural features: 
differentiation and integration.  When used in a cross-cultural context, it refers to “the degree to 
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which people accept the reasonableness of clashing cultural perspectives on how to live and, 
consequently, the degree to which they are motivated to develop cognitive schemas that integrate 
these competing worldviews by explaining how different people can come to such divergent 
conclusions or by specifying ways of blending potentially discordant norms and values” (Tadmor 
et al., 2009, p. 106).  Given this definition, cultural complexity shares with integrative 
complexity the element of acknowledging competing perspectives.  However, there are three key 
points where cultural complexity and integrative complexity diverge. 
First, integrative complexity describes a particular way that a person constructs cognitive 
representations of two cultures, whereas cultural complexity requires no such condition.  Instead, 
a self-identified monocultural can still demonstrate high cultural complexity as long as he or she 
is capable of simultaneously appreciating and criticizing cultural norms, just like the Taiwanese 
student we saw at the beginning.  Second, cultural complexity does not require the integration of 
competing worldviews.  A person does not have to forge a conceptual link between his or her 
incongruent evaluations of cultural norms.  Third, Tadmor and Tetlock (2006) postulate that 
adopting a bicultural strategy (i.e., strong identification with both home and host cultures) in 
acculturation process leads to integrative complexity, whereas cultural complexity is not linked 
to cultural identification at the theoretical level.  For instance, on the one hand, it is possible that 
for people who see culture as peripheral to their identity to turn a critical eye toward their culture 
(see also Hopkin, Hoyle, & Toner, 2014).  On the other hand, Packer (2008) suggests that a 
strong group identifier could choose to criticize and disobey a group norm particularly when a 
norm is perceived to be harmful to the group.  Therefore, strong and weak cultural identification 
could both be related to cultural complexity.  To sum up, cultural complexity is different from 
integrative complexity in that it can be observed in monoculturals, needs not entail a conceptual 
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connection among judgements on culture, and is theoretically unrelated to cultural identity. 
Intersubjective cultural representation and cultural complexity.  Last, I will contrast 
cultural complexity with the intersubjective cultural representation approach (Chiu et al., 2010; 
Wan, Chiu, Peng, et al., 2007).  This approach contends that cultural values that are collectively 
perceived to be important to most members in a culture is a conduit through which culture 
influences a wide array of behaviors, including cultural identification (Wan, Chiu, Peng, et al., 
2007), social cognition (Zou et al., 2009), and political attitudes (Wan, Tam, & Chiu, 2010).  
Translated to practice, values with high intersubjective importance are determined through a 
two-step process.  Respondents are given a list of values, and they rate the extent to which each 
of these values is important to them as well as the extent to which they believed it to be 
important to an average member of their group.  The perceived importance ratings are then 
averaged to yield an index of intersubjective importance. 
Cultural complexity and intersubjectively important values only overlaps minimally at 
the conceptual level.  Both constructs are based on a clear separation of personal versus cultural 
norms or values, and both acknowledge that there is likely to be a dissociation between the two.  
On the other hand, two differences can be identified.  First, in contrast to the intersubjective 
approach, cultural complexity champions a subjective perspective on culture—cultural norms 
may or may not be shared by members of a cultural group (Fischer et al., 2009).  In other words, 
cultural complexity can be evident in what an individual believes without referring to the 
collective perception.  Second, the focus of the constructs is different: Cultural complexity is 
derived from the variability in personal endorsement of perceived cultural norms, whereas the 
intersubjective approach looks at the overall levels (i.e., mean scores) of intersubjectively 
important values, personally important values, or relationships between the two.  For the reasons 
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noted above, a clear distinction can be drawn between cultural complexity and the intersubjective 
representation approach. 
Measuring Cultural Complexity 
I have articulated the construct of cultural complexity—its defining features and how it is 
different from other concepts.  The question that follows is how to measure it in a way that is in 
accordance with its characteristics.  One intuitive, common method is to develop a Likert-type 
self-report scale with items explicitly about cultural complexity.  However, there are some 
potential limitations to this methodology. 
Because cultural complexity can be interpreted by lay people as a positive trait (imagine 
yourself responding to a question like: “I can see both the good and the bad in my culture.”), it is 
very likely that social desirability could contaminate the results derived from such an approach.   
Moreover, it is unclear to what extent cultural complexity is easily accessible to people.  
Schwarz (1999) has argued that when reporting their attitudes, people do not retrieve all 
knowledge that could affect their judgment on a target.  Instead, as long as the information 
searching process has yielded an evaluation with sufficient subjective certainty, people will stop 
and report the result.  This perspective makes a direct self-report measure on cultural complexity 
highly susceptible to contextual influences.  For instance, for an American who is committed to 
social justice, he or she might find it difficult to agree with a scale item assessing the ability to 
see both good and bad aspects of American culture; instead his or her answer might be skewed 
toward the negative side due to the salience of racial tensions that have received wide media 
coverage recently (i.e., high temporal accessibility; Higgins, 1996).  Also, empirical studies on 
ambivalent attitudes point out that people can possess incongruent associations with an object 
without awareness (Newby-Clark et al., 2002).   
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These concerns could be effectively circumvented by modifying the Subjective 
Masculine Norms Questionnaire originally developed by Y. J. Wong et al. (2016) to a measure 
of cultural norms, from which cultural complexity can be indirectly inferred.  I refer to this 
measure as the Subjective Cultural Norms Questionnaire (SCNQ).  This questionnaire contains 
two sections.  In short, participants first provide open-ended responses to describe six injunctive 
cultural norms they perceive to be widespread in their culture.  Next, they are asked to indicate 
the degree of endorsement of these six norms on a 7-point Likert-type scale (see the Method 
section for a detailed description).  The standard deviation of the six endorsement scores (rather 
than the mean score) serves as the index of cultural complexity.  
This approach confers several methodological advantages.  First, the intention of the 
scale is not obvious, thus minimizing the social desirability threat.  In this sense, the cultural 
complexity measure can be considered implicit because it is not based on direct self-assessment 
of cultural complexity but inferred from self-reported endorsement of cultural norms (Gawronski 
& De Houwer, 2014).  Second, the open question format allows people to compose whatever 
norms they perceive to be widely shared in their culture, which is consistent with the subjectivity 
proposition underlying cultural complexity.  Having defined cultural complexity conceptually 
earlier in this chapter, I now supplement it with an operational definition of cultural 
complexity—the standard deviation of the level of endorsement across the six cultural norms in a 
person’s responses to the SCNQ.  This measure will be used in the three studies in this research. 
Overview of the Studies and Predictions 
In a set of three studies, I introduced the novel concept of cultural complexity to address 
gaps in the psychological literature on culture.  The main purpose of this research was twofold: 
(a) to provide evidence supporting the validity of cultural complexity using both attitudinal and 
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behavioral outcomes, and (b) to test whether cultural complexity can be experimentally 
manipulated.  To achieve these goals, I identified a nomological network of cultural complexity 
and employed different research designs to investigate its causal effects across multiple domains 
of outcomes (intergroup perceptions and behavioral outcomes). 
Study 1 was a cross-sectional, correlational research that set up the nomological network 
of cultural complexity by inspecting the directions of its associations with other theoretically 
relevant variables.  I proposed that dialecticism, the personality of openness, need for cognition, 
and low need for closure would contribute to cultural complexity, which in turn led to cultural 
humility, low cultural superiority, a less essentialized view of culture, and increased intercultural 
contact.  Additionally, Study 1 also tested if the predicted pattern of correlations would be 
culturally invariant and if cross-cultural differences existed in levels of cultural complexity 
(American vs. Chinese).  I hypothesized that the association patterns would hold cross-culturally, 
Chinese participants would have higher cultural complexity than Americans participants, and 
people would show higher cultural complexity when the target culture is more familiar. 
Study 2 intended to bolster the validity of cultural complexity by investigating the role 
that cultural complexity played in intergroup perception through an experimental design with 
American college students.  I first experimentally created identity threat (vs. no identity threat) 
and then assessed people’s attitudes toward a racial ingroup and outgroup.  Controlling for 
cultural identification, I anticipated that cultural complexity would not only temper prejudice 
toward an outgroup (main effect), but also moderate the relationship between identity threat and 
intergroup bias (interaction effect) in such a way that identity threat would only enhance 
intergroup bias for those low in cultural complexity. 
Study 3 examined the relationship between cultural complexity and a biased information 
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seeking tendency.  It built upon Study 2 in three key aspects.  First, cultural complexity was 
experimentally manipulated rather than measured, suggesting that cultural complexity indeed 
caused changes in people’s selective exposure to messages.  Second, I recruited Chinese college 
students in China as participants to further examine the external validity of cultural complexity.  
Third, the impact of cultural complexity was assessed on a behavioral outcome—message 
selection.  Specifically, I examined if cultural complexity affected Chinese participants’ selection 
pattern (one-sided or balanced) of the type of information they wanted to read regarding a 
controversial issue involving China (i.e., the territorial disputes in the South China Sea).  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions: high cultural complexity or 
control.  I hypothesized that high cultural complexity would lead to a more balanced perspective 
on the issue than a preference for either pro-ingroup or anti-ingroup information. 
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Chapter II: Study 1: Nomological Network 
This study aimed to establish the validity of cultural complexity through mapping its 
nomological network.  First, with regard to antecedents, I surmised that cultural complexity 
would be positively related to dialectical thinking, a holistic cognitive mindset that is more 
accepting of change and has a higher tolerance of contradiction (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-
Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010), as the two have in common the tendency to accept seemingly 
contradictory elements.  Indeed, research has shown that individuals with dialectical thinking are 
more likely to show emotional complexity (the co-occurrence of positive and negative feelings; 
Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, & Wang, 2010) and to endorse a self-view that emphasizes both the 
good and the bad aspects (Boucher, Peng, Shi, & Wang, 2009). 
Second, I hypothesized that the Big-Five personality trait of openness to experience 
would be positively associated with cultural complexity, because presumably cognitive 
complexity demands cognitive resources and openness to experiences is commonly associated 
with traits that meet this demand (e.g., curious, intelligent, broad-minded; Barrick & Mount, 
1991). 
Third, to the extent that cultural complexity is more cognitively taxing than a valence-
consistent profile of endorsing cultural norms, need for cognition is assumed to be positively 
correlated with cultural complexity.  In other words, people who derive satisfaction from 
effortful information processing are expected to have higher level of cultural complexity than 
cognitive misers, as need for cognition prompts a thorough consideration of information 
available and reduces reliance on simple cues and stereotypes (Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & 
McCaslin, 2009). 
The fourth hypothesis was a negative relationship between need for closure and cultural 
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complexity.  Need for closure refers to the degree to which people feel uneasy in the face of 
cognitive uncertainty or ambiguity, which has been found to contribute to opinion uniformity in 
groups (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006). 
Concerning consequences, I predicted that cultural complexity would show negative 
relationships with a sense of superiority of one’s culture and positively with cultural humility.  It 
is conceivable that the ability to view one’s cultural norms as containing something good and 
something bad would generate a sense of humility and decrease superiority, as one of the 
essential factors in humility is a recognition of one’s strengths and weaknesses (McElroy et al., 
2014; Tangney, 2000).  Furthermore, I hypothesized that cultural complexity would be 
associated with a less essentialist view on culture because cultural complexity presumably 
promotes openness about culture and thus downplays a fixed, rigid categorical perspective on 
cultural groups.  Finally, I anticipated that higher levels of cultural complexity would be 
positively linked to contact with racial/national outgroups, because of an open attitude towards 
one’s culture and also because of research linking anti-essentialism and an increased motivation 
to cross category boundaries (Prentice & Miller, 2007; Rosenthal & Levy, 2016).  To sum up, I 
proposed a model where cultural complexity mediates the relationships between the following 
theorized antecedents: dialectical thinking, openness to experience, need for cognition, and need 
for closure, and the following outcomes: cultural humility, cultural superiority, cultural 
essentialism, and intercultural contact (see Figure 1). 
The last set of hypotheses situated cultural complexity in different cultural contexts (U.S. 
college students vs. Chinese international college students living in the United States).  First, I 
expected the above theorized model would hold for both U.S. Americans and for Chinese.  
Second, due to Chinese people’s stronger propensity of dialecticism relative to U.S. Americans 
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(Peng, Spencer-Rodgers, & Nian, 2006), I anticipated that Chinese people would demonstrate a 
higher level of cultural complexity than U.S. Americans.  Third, presumably, increased 
knowledge about a culture endows people with more information from which they could develop 
both positive and negative evaluations.  Evidence can be gleaned from the finding that people are 
more likely to respond positively and negatively to entities that they are familiar with than those 
they have little knowledge of (Brooks, Highhouse, Russell, & Mohr, 2003).  Therefore, I 
hypothesized that cultural complexity be higher when Chinese participants evaluate Chinese 
versus U.S. cultures.  Relatedly, I predicted that Chinese participants’ cultural complexity of 
U.S. culture would be positively correlated with their familiarity with U.S. culture.     
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 220 participants (127 U.S. American and 93 international students of 
Chinese descent) studying in colleges or graduate schools in the U.S.  Data from one participant 
was deleted due to conspicuously random response pattern, resulting in a final sample size of 219 
(age M = 23.47 years, SD = 3.83, range = 18-33 years; 61% female and 39% male, excluding 37 
participants who did not indicate their gender).  For the 127 U.S. students, the average age was 
21.42 years, SD = 2.66, range = 18-30 years; 72.4% female and 27.6% male; 85.7% White, 5.7% 
Hispanic, 3.8% Asian, 1.9% Black, 1% Native, and 1.9% multiracial.  With respect to the 92 
Chinese international students, the average age was 26.29 years, SD = 3.39, range = 19-33 years; 
45.5% female and 54.5% male.   
Procedure 
Participants were recruited through social media (e.g., Facebook), listservs (e.g., Chinese 
student organizations, students taking counseling classes), Craigslist, and flyers.  Participants 
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were informed of the voluntary nature of their participation and were given the opportunity to 
enter in a draw for a $20 Amazon gift card upon the completion of this study.  Participants were 
instructed to fill out an online survey with all the following measures using a computer or 
smartphone of their choice.  They were told to complete the survey in a quiet environment free of 
distractions.  Chinese participants were asked to complete the SCNQ twice, with Chinese and 
U.S. American as the target cultures, respectively.  At the end of the survey, all participants 
answered some demographic questions, and Chinese participants were additionally asked to 
report how familiar they are with U.S. culture.  
Measures 
Cultural complexity.  An adapted version of the Subjective Masculine Norms 
Questionnaire (Y. J. Wong et al., 2016) was used throughout this research to assess cultural 
complexity.  This modified measure, namely, the SCNQ, consists of two parts.  Participants are 
first asked to come up with three prescriptive norms and three proscriptive norms through a 
semi-structured format.  In particular, participants complete the sentences “In American 
[Chinese] culture, most people believe that individuals should” and “In American [Chinese] 
culture, most people believe that individuals should NOT” three times for each.  Soliciting these 
two types of cultural norms has the advantage of covering a broader range of subjective norms.  
Furthermore, by solely focusing on injunctive norms rather than descriptive norms, SCNQ 
avoids conflating descriptive norms with stereotypes.  For example, the statement that “most 
Americans are dog lovers” can be a descriptive norm as well as a stereotype.  
In the second part, participants indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with 
the six subjective cultural norms they generate on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = 
Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree.  The standard deviation across the six responses to the 
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subjective norms is the index of cultural complexity, with a higher value reflecting a higher level 
of cultural complexity.  To illustrate, a person whose endorsement scores of the six norms are 2, 
2, 2, 4, 4, 4 will have a score of 1 (standard deviation of the six values) on cultural complexity. 
Dialecticism.  Participants completed the 14-item brief version of Dialectical Self Scale 
(DSS; Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004), with items such as “When I hear two sides 
of an argument, I often agree with both” rated on a 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) 
scale.  The DSS possesses adequate cross-cultural validity and reliability.  Specifically, past 
research indicated that DSS was negatively correlated with self-concept stability and favorable 
attitudes towards ingroup for East-Asian (including both Asians and Asian Americans) and 
European-heritage participants (Ma-Kellams, Spencer-Rodgers, & Peng, 2011; Spencer-Rodgers 
et al., 2004).  With regard to reliability, alpha coefficients for DSS ranged from .67 to .73 and 
from .82 to .86 for Asian-heritage participants and European-heritage participants, respectively 
(Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Spencer-Rodgers, et al., 2010).  The Cronbach’s alphas for this 
study were .71 for U.S. sample and .87 for Chinese sample. 
Need for cognition.  The 18-item Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 
1984) measures dispositional differences in intrinsic motivation to engage in and enjoy effortful 
cognitive endeavors (sample item: “I enjoy abstract thinking”).  Items are rated on a 7-point scale 
(1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) and an overall score is computed as the mean of all 
items.  Higher scores on this scale indicate greater need for cognition.  Past research found that 
for Chinese participants, need for cognition was associated positively with concern for truth and 
openness to experience, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .84 to .88 (Ku & Ho, 2010).  For 
U.S. participants, Carnevale, Inbar, and Lerner (2011) reported that need for cognition was 
linked to better decision-making competence; Cronbach’s alpha was .90 according to Cacioppo 
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et al. (1984).  This scale exhibited good to excellent reliability based on the current sample, with 
Cronbach’s alphas of .88 and .93 for U.S. and Chinese samples, respectively. 
Openness.  The openness subscale from the 40-Item Mini Marker Set (Saucier, 1994) 
assesses the Big-Five personality factors of openness to experience (hereafter openness).  
Participants indicate how accurate eight adjectives related to openness describe themselves on a 
9-point scale ranging from 1 (Extremely inaccurate) to 9 (Extremely accurate).  Sample 
adjectives are “Creative” and “Imaginative.”  Evidence of construct validity was reported by S. 
S. Wong, Lee, Ang, Oei, and Ng (2009) who found that for Singaporean Chinese, openness was 
correlated positively and negatively with optimism and pessimism, respectively.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha was reported to vary between .70 to .76 (Chen, Xie, & Chang, 2011; S. S. 
Wong et al., 2009).  In addition, based on American samples, past studies indicated a positive 
association between openness and creativity (Kelly, 2006), and a Cronbach’s alpha of .78 was 
reported (Saucier, 1994; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004).  For this study, the scale 
demonstrated acceptable reliability for U.S. participants (α = .72) and excellent reliability for 
Chinese sample (α = .93). 
Need for closure.  The brief, 15-item version of the Need for Closure Scale (Roets & 
Van Hiel, 2011) measures an individual’s inclination to “seize” on cognitive closure quickly and 
a desire to maintain or “freeze” on closure.  A sample item includes: “I dislike unpredictable 
situations.”  All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree).  
An overall score is computed as the mean of all items, with higher scores on this scale reflecting 
greater need for closure.  Evidence of construct validity was provided by Roets, Soetens, Au and 
Guan (2014) who revealed a positive correlation between need for closure and seeing choices as 
a burden for both Chinese and American samples, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .82 
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to .87.  In this study, I found Cronbach’s alphas of .81 and .95 for U.S. and Chinese participants, 
respectively. 
Cultural superiority.  A sense of cultural superiority was assessed by the superiority 
subscale in the Measure of Identification with Groups (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & 
Eidelson, 2008).  This scale was modified to refer to the participants’ affiliation with other 
members with the same nationality (Roccas et al., 2008).  Participants were asked to report their 
level of agreement (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) with statements regarding their 
affiliation with other nationals.  A sample item is “Relative to other nations, we 
(Americans/Chinese) are very moral.”  The measure includes five items and scores reflect the 
mean of all items, with a higher value denoting a greater sense of superiority.  Sagiv, Roccas, 
and Hazan provided preliminary support for the construct validity by showing that participants’ 
perceived group superiority increased when high group status was experimentally created (as 
cited in Roccas et al., 2008).  Rinker and Neighbors (2014) demonstrated that the Cronbach’s 
alpha was .83 for American college students.  No construct validity information was available for 
Chinese participants.  The current study showed the Cronbach’s alphas were .78 for the U.S. 
sample and .88 for the Chinese sample. 
Cultural humility.  The abbreviated Specific Intellectual Humility Scale consisting of 
three items was used to measure humility regarding one’s cultural knowledge (Hoyle, Davisson, 
Diebels, & Leary, 2016).  Participants report their degree of agreement on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale with 1 = Strongly disagree and 7 = Strongly agree.  A sample item is: “My views about 
American culture today may someday turn out to be wrong.”  Holye et al. found a reduction in 
intellectual humility as people’s stance became more extreme in various topics, lending support 
to its construct validity.  They also reported coefficient alphas that ranged from .77 to .86.  The 
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scale demonstrated good reliability based on the current sample (α = .80 and .87 for the U.S. and 
Chinese samples, respectively). 
Cultural essentialism.  The Cultural Essentialism Scale measures the degree to which an 
individual sees culture as a trait-like, stable feature that defines a person and influences his or her 
behavior (Fischer, 2011).  This scale contains 15 items, with sample items as follows: “Culture is 
a central aspect of a person's personality, it defines who you are”, “People who belong to a 
different culture are a distinct type of person.”  Responses are recorded on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale (1 = “Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”).  Cultural essentialism has been shown to 
correlate positively with open-mindedness and a motivation to understand other culture, with 
Cronbach’s alphas varying between .67 to .74 for a New Zealander sample (Fischer, 2011).  For 
the current study, Cronbach’s alphas of .64 and .91 were found for the U.S. and Chinese samples, 
respectively. 
Familiarity with American culture.  Chinese participants responded to a single-item 
measure: “To what degree are you familiar with American culture?” on a 5-point Likert type 
scale ranging from 1 (Not at all familiar) to 5 (Extremely familiar). 
Intergroup contact.  A 4-item measure of intergroup contact and friendship on a scale of 
1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) was administered.  Specifically, participants self-reported the amount 
of: (1) chatting with students at their university from racial/ethnic groups other than their own, 
(2) doing social things with students at their university from racial/ethnic groups other than their 
own, (3) having friends from racial/ethnic groups other than their own, and (4) visiting friends 
from racial/ethnic groups other than their own in those friends’ homes (Rosenthal & Levy, 
2016). A mean score is calculated to create an index of intergroup contact, with higher scores 
reflecting increased contact with outgroups.  Evidence of construct validity was shown by a 
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positive correlation with polyculturalism (Rosenthal & Levy, 2016).  Cronbach’s alphas fell 
between .85 and .89 in a racially diverse sample composed of both participants born in and 
outside of U.S. (Rosenthal & Levy, 2016).  Excellent reliability (α = .90 for U.S. and .96 for 
Chinese participants) was found for the present study. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses and Data Analytic Plans 
According to Fritz and MacKinnon (2007), a sample of 71 is required to detect a 
significant mediation effect using bias-corrected bootstrapping, assuming power = .80 and 
coefficients for paths a and b = .39.  Hence, the sample size of 219 participants for this study was 
sufficient. 
I first examined potential associations between demographic variables and the main 
variables.  Results from independent t tests showed that among the nine variables of interest, 
male participants scored significantly higher than female participants only on dialecticism, p 
< .05.  At the bivariate level, Pearson correlations revealed that age was significantly associated 
with five out of nine main variables (cultural complexity, dialecticism, need for closure, 
openness, cultural essentialism), p < .05.  However, the decision was made not to include age as 
a covariate because (a) there was no convincing conceptual and empirical reason to do so, and 
(b) the results were almost identical when age was added as a covariate in my analyses (see 
Appendix I). 
To handle missing values in the main study variables, I used the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm, a maximum likelihood method that scholars have recommended 
over older missing data methods, such as mean substitution or listwise deletion (Schafer & 
Graham, 2002).  There was no evidence suggesting that the data were not missing completely at 
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random, χ2(44) = 42.49, p = .54.  Hence, the EM algorithm was used to generate imputed values.  
All subsequent analyses were conducted after imputation of missing data. 
Because I proposed cultural complexity as a unique construct that is conceptually distinct 
from the endorsement of subjective cultural norms (based on the mean of SCNQ items), I 
inspected the correlation between the two.  A significantly negative correlation with moderate 
strength was found, r = -.41.  I further compared the patterns of association with other variables 
of cultural complexity and of the SCNQ mean score.  Cultural complexity was significantly 
related to all eight variables, whereas only four correlation coefficients were significant for the 
SCNQ mean score (see Table 1a).  These findings suggest that cultural complexity and the 
endorsement of subjective cultural norms are related but distinct constructs.  
The first set of hypotheses pertained to the models of cultural complexity as a mediator 
linking the pathways of theorized four antecedents and four consequences.  Pearson’s r 
correlation was used to test if the theorized relationships among all variables could be observed 
at the bivariate level.  Second, to test the 16 mediation models (four antecedents × four 
consequences), I used bias-corrected bootstrapping by creating 5,000 bootstrap samples (Fritz & 
MacKinnon, 2007).  An SPSS analytical tool, PROCESS, which combines regression and 
bootstrapping methods, was employed to test all mediation models (Hayes, 2013).  Significant 
mediation effects would be assumed if the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of the indirect effects 
excluded zero.  It should be emphasized that a significant relationship between the predictor and 
outcome is not a criterion for a significant mediation effect (Hayes, 2009).  I did not use 
structural equation modeling to examine our mediation effects because my sample size was too 
small to accommodate latent variables.  
To address the second set of hypotheses that situated cultural complexity in different 
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cultural contexts, I first divided the samples into U.S. and Chinese subgroups and performed the 
16 mediation analyses with both samples to test if cultural complexity was a significant mediator 
for these two subgroups.  Of note, I did not test for structural invariance of mediation effects.  I 
also ran t-tests to examine if (a) Chinese participants had higher cultural complexity than 
Americans concerning their own respective national cultures, and (b) if Chinese participants 
demonstrated stronger cultural complexity when they rated Chinese culture compared to U.S. 
American culture. 
Main Analyses 
All the correlation coefficients between cultural complexity and the hypothesized 
antecedents and consequences were significant at p < .01 and in the predicted direction, 
providing preliminary support for the hypothesized nomological network (see Table 1a).  In the 
regression models, consistent with the proposed nomological network, the bootstrap results 
indicated that cultural complexity was a significant mediator between all hypothesized 
antecedents and outcomes.  That is, all 16 mediation models were significant, rendering strong 
support for the nomological network (Table 2a). 
With respect to the second set of hypotheses, results of correlation and mediation 
analyses for both the U.S. and Chinese samples revealed that cultural complexity appeared to 
function differently for these two samples, in contradiction to my hypothesis.  At the bivariate 
level, cultural complexity was only significantly and positively associated with dialecticism (r 
= .25), but not with any of the other variables for U.S. participants.  Standing in stark contrast, all 
correlational relationships were significant and in the predicted direction for Chinese individuals 
(Table 1b).  Likewise, mediation analyses uncovered that for the U.S. sample, only one out of 16 
models whose 95% CI did not include zero: the mediation path from dialecticism to cultural 
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complexity to intergroup contact, B = .08, SE = .05, 95% CI [.003, .217] (Table 2b).  
Furthermore, the effect sizes were all very small, ranging from -.04 to .05, with the majority of 
them falling into the range of -.01 to .01.  For Chinese participants, except for three models 
(cultural complexity as the mediator between dialecticism and cultural essentialism, between 
need for closure and cultural superiority, and between need for closure and cultural essentialism), 
cultural complexity was found to have a significant mediation effect for the 13 remaining models 
(Table 2c).  Taken together, the hypothesized nomological network held for the most part for 
Chinese international students but not for U.S. students.  
In addition, a series of t-tests were performed to examine if significant differences existed 
in levels of cultural complexity.  When comparing cultural complexity of each sample evaluating 
their respective culture, Chinese participants did not differ significantly from U.S. participants in 
cultural complexity, t(217) = 1.20, p = .23.  Furthermore, as Chinese participants reported 
cultural complexity for both Chinese and U.S. cultures, I tested the hypothesis that their cultural 
complexity would be higher for Chinese culture relative to U.S. culture.  A paired samples t-test 
did not lend support to the hypothesis, t(79) = -1.46, p = .15.  Similarly, the hypothesis that U.S. 
participants would demonstrate higher cultural complexity than Chinese participants with the 
target culture being U.S. culture was not supported.  Instead, Chinese participants had greater 
cultural complexity than US participants with regard to U.S. culture, t(217) = 2.17, p < .05.  I 
conjectured that dialecticism may be a possible explanation for this unexpected finding.  
Specifically, because dialecticism has its root in Taoism, an Eastern intellectual tradition (Peng, 
Spencer-Rodgers, & Nian, 2006), I conducted a posthoc analysis to test the idea that dialecticism 
would mediate the nationality differences in cultural complexity.  A t-test revealed that the 
Chinese sample had a higher degree of dialecticism than the U.S. sample, t(143.24) = 4.02, p 
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< .01, and this difference mediated the relationship between nationality and cultural complexity, 
B = .18, 95% CI [.09, .32], completely standardized indirect effect = .12, 95% CI [.06, .20].  
Finally, I examined if Chinese participants’ cultural complexity of U.S. culture was related to 
their degree of familiarity with U.S. culture.  Pearson’s r showed a significant positive 
correlation between the two (r = .34, p < .01), providing some evidence for the hypothesis.  
Discussion 
The main purpose of Study 1 was to situate the novel construct of cultural complexity in 
theoretically driven models consisting of personality variables as antecedents and culturally 
relevant variables as consequences.  Cultural complexity and the endorsement of subjective 
cultural norms were differentially related to other conceptually relevant variables, indicating that 
cultural complexity was a distinct construct from the endorsement of subjective cultural norms.  
However, the results depicted a somewhat puzzling picture of cultural complexity.  When the 
unit of analysis was the entire sample, regardless of cultural background, cultural complexity 
functioned as predicted.  All correlation coefficients between cultural complexity and the 
proposed antecedents and consequences were significant.  Additionally, the findings that cultural 
complexity was a significant mediator in all 16 models supported the nomological network in 
which dialectical thinking (expectation of change and tolerance of ambivalence), low need for 
closure (desire for a definite answer to a question and the eschewal of ambiguity), need for 
cognition, and openness to experience seemed to contribute to cultural complexity, which in turn 
increased individuals’ humble attitude toward their culture, decreased cultural 
superiority/ethnocentrism, and facilitated interactions with people from different ethnic/racial 
backgrounds.   
However, surprisingly, I found evidence suggesting that the hypothesized nomological 
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network only held for Chinese international students but not for U.S. college students.  First, at 
the bivariate level, cultural complexity was significantly linked to all variables for the Chinese 
sample, but only positively and significantly correlated with dialecticism for the U.S. sample.  
Second, with respect to mediation analyses, for the Chinese international student sample, the 
mediating effect of cultural complexity was significant in 13 out of 16 models (except the 
following three models: dialecticism  cultural complexity  cultural essentialism, need for 
closure  cultural complexity  cultural superiority, and need for closure  cultural 
complexity  cultural essentialism).  On the contrary, for the U.S. student sample, cultural 
complexity did not mediate any of the relationships between all antecedents and consequences.  
Perhaps cultural complexity is a more meaningful construct for Chinese international students 
because the situation they face predisposes them to an enhanced accessibility of the cultural 
dimension of their identity.  According to the social-cognitive view, self-concept is a network of 
identity schemas where individuals balance multiple identities and that only a few are activated 
in consciousness at a given time (Skitka, 2003).  As such, the ability to see culture as consisting 
of both good and bad will only exert its influence when cultural facet of the self is cognitively 
accessible.  Consequently, for Chinese international students, their unique experience as an 
expatriate in a new country may heighten the sense of salience of their identity vis-à-vis the out-
group (e.g., U.S. culture), and thus strengthens the effects of cultural complexity in my theorized 
models.  Another alternative explanation is selection bias.  Chinese international students could 
be a selective group who might be more predisposed to the positive effects of cultural 
complexity since they chose to study in the U.S. 
Besides this unexpected finding, the general hypothesis that familiarity of a culture 
breeds cultural complexity received inconsistent support in Study 1.  On the one hand, contrary 
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to the hypothesis, when evaluating U.S. culture of which U.S. participants presumably were 
more knowledgeable than Chinese participants, U.S. participants demonstrated lower cultural 
complexity than Chinese participants did.  On the other hand, Chinese participants’ degree of 
familiarity with U.S. culture was positively associated with their level of cultural complexity of 
U.S. culture.  I surmised that there are at least three other factors, in addition to familiarity with a 
culture, that may account for the findings. 
First, literature has shown that dialecticism is more prevalent in East Asian cultures 
relative to U.S. culture (Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010), which was also the case for 
the current study.  To the extent that dialecticism is conducive to cultural complexity, one should 
expect Chinese people to be more inclined to cultural complexity than U.S. Americans.  Second, 
Benet-Martinez, Lee, and Liu (2006) uncovered that individuals who had extensive exposure to 
two cultures formed more complex cultural representations relative to monoculturals because 
they were more likely to spend considerable effort in understanding their host culture and 
developing strategies to adapt to it.  This experience may increase individuals’ ability to detect, 
process, and organize everyday cultural meaning, which appeared to be a plausible explanation 
for why Chinese international students in this study reported higher cultural complexity than 
U.S. students.  Finally, because of a strong dialectical mindset, Chinese individuals were found 
to exhibit in-group derogation, meaning that they are prone to have relatively negative ingroup 
attitudes (Ma-Kellams et al., 2011).  As group identity satisfaction was associated with 
endorsement of subjective group norms (Y. J. Wong et al., 2016), it makes conceptual sense that 
Chinese participants’ unfavorable feeling toward their group could lead to a weaker level of 
endorsement of cultural norms.  Theoretically and statistically speaking, if the endorsement level 
is low in general, it leaves little room for variation, and thus a reduced cultural complexity for 
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Chinese culture is observed for Chinese participants. 
To sum up, Study 1 depicted a mix picture of how cultural complexity relates to the 
hypothesized antecedents and consequences.  The proposed nomological network received 
support when the unit of analysis was the entire sample, but further breakdown of the sample 
revealed that the mediating effect of cultural complexity was only evident for Chinese 
international students, not for U.S. college students.  These findings may be attributable to the 
differences in the degree to which culture is prominent in individuals’ mind.  Chinese 
international student’s experiences adjusting to the host culture and their being perceived by 
others as distinct could make cultural knowledge highly central to their self-definitions.  Cultural 
complexity is thus more likely to be a meaningful construct for Chinese international students. 
My ability to draw conclusions from this study is limited because of several concerns.  
First, this study utilized a correlational design to evaluate theorized causal relationships.  Despite 
the theoretical foundation and some statistical evidence supporting the nomological network, 
there could be extraneous factors undermining the validity of the findings, such as cultural 
identity (i.e., a person’s subjective orientation toward his or her cultural group).  Second, the 
universality of cultural complexity was unclear—the absence of support for the U.S. student 
sample could be due to the lack of accessibility in memory or selection bias.  Third, the 
consequences in the nomological network were limited, and they did not include people’s 
attitudes toward other cultures.  Fourth, the reliability of some outcome measures for U.S. 
sample were low (e.g., α = .71 for DSS, α = .64 for Cultural Essentialism Scale), raising 
concerns over the results.  Given the above issues, Study 2 employed an experimental design, 
controlled for cultural identity, focused on U.S. college students, and made culture temporarily 
salient by the presence of a racial outgroup. 
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Chapter III: Study 2: Intergroup Perceptions 
Study 1 provided preliminary evidence for the validity of cultural complexity.  Study 2 
aimed to further establish the predictive power of cultural complexity by examining the role that 
cultural complexity plays in intergroup processes.  Specifically, U.S. participants were randomly 
assigned to identity threat vs. no threat conditions.  Participants’ perceived level of cultural 
identity threat was manipulated by presenting them with different results of how a fictitious 
group of Chinese people think about U.S. Americans (see Voci, 2006).  After the manipulation, 
participants completed measures of intergroup bias, breaking down into two components (as 
suggested by Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014): feelings towards U.S. Americans (ingroup) and 
Chinese (outgroup).  To increase the power of the study, besides directly assessing the affective 
dimension of attitude towards ingroup and outgroup, I included an indirect measure of the 
cognitive dimension of attitude toward outgroup, namely, the desirability of personality traits 
that U.S. Americans associate with Chinese.  Investigating both cognitive and affective 
dimensions of intergroup attitudes was important because research has shown that these 
dimensions are uniquely associated with intergroup interaction variables, such as ingroup and 
outgroup evaluations, intergroup bias, and intergroup conflict (Jackson, 2002). 
Past studies have uncovered that when a group’s esteem is threatened, strong group 
identifiers display a heightened intergroup bias, manifested as either outgroup derogation 
(Branscombe & Wann, 1994) or both ingroup love and outgroup hate (Voci, 2006).  Therefore, I 
statistically controlled for cultural identification to untangle the effect of cultural complexity on 
reactions to group identity threat.  I put forth two hypotheses: (a) cultural complexity would 
lessen intergroup bias by reducing outgroup derogation, and (b) identity threat would enhance 
intergroup bias, but cultural complexity was hypothesized to moderate this relationship, such that 
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cultural complexity would attenuate the effect of identity threat on intergroup bias.  The rationale 
was twofold.  First, Study 1 suggested that cultural complexity was associated with a humble 
evaluation of one’s ingroup and an open, tolerant attitude toward outgroups.  Humility may be 
theoretically irrelevant to ingroup positivity, but both humility and tolerance were shown to 
assuage outgroup prejudice (Aboud, 2003; Hodson & Dhont, 2015).  Second, cultural complexity 
may decrease the tendency to see one’s culture as a tight group with clear boundary, which then 
fosters openness to criticism.  Indirect support for this prediction can be gleaned from empirical 
finding that people who endorsed polyculturalism (a de-essentialized view of culture that is also 
a premise of cultural complexity) were more open to criticisms about their own culture 
(Rosenthal, Levy, & Moss, 2012).  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 400 U.S. college/graduate students above the age of 18 were recruited for this 
study through Amazon Mechanical Turk, Craigslist, flyers distributed on IU campus, and emails 
sent to IU students in counseling minor.  Participants were offered an opportunity to enter a draw 
to earn a $20 Amazon gift card upon completion.  After deleting data from participants who did 
not respond to any measures (186 cases) and whose responses demonstrated a conspicuously 
random pattern (3 cases), the final sample size consisted of 211 students (average age = 23.59, 
SD = 5.64, range 18-49; White 72.1%, Asian 9.6%, Black 8.2%, Hispanic 3.4%, Native 0.5%, 
other 6.3%; 68.3% female, 30.3% male, 0.5% others; three participants did not indicate their race 
and gender).   
Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental (identity threat) or control (no 
threat) conditions.  Cultural complexity and cultural identification were measured for all the 
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participants.  The study thereby constituted an Identity Threat (threat vs. no threat) × Cultural 
Complexity (continuously scored) design.  The dependent variables were the desirability of traits 
reported to be indicative of Chinese and attitudes towards ingroup and outgroup (adapted from 
Voci, 2006). 
Participants were informed that the study consisted of two separate sessions.  First, 
participants filled out an online survey composed of SCNQ, cultural identity, and other filler 
questions.  In the second session, participants were told that the purpose of the study was to 
explore the reciprocal perceptions of Chinese and U.S. Americans.  Next, participants were led to 
believe that the data concerning Chinese participants had already been collected, and as an 
example of the type of research conducted, a fictitious result was presented to them.  Participants 
then saw a graph with histograms that showed four traits that the Chinese participants allegedly 
endorsed as typical of U.S. Americans (see Appendix J).  In addition, the traits were paired with 
the degree of desirability (0-10, the higher the more desirable) rated by the Chinese participants.  
For the identity threat condition, four negative traits and low desirability ratings were shown 
(arrogant, 0.5; ignorant, 1.1; annoying, 1.2; and materialistic, 1.8).  For the control condition, the 
graph was composed of four neutral traits and medium desirability ratings (bold, 5.4; proud, 5.6; 
excitable, 5.1; normal, 5.5).  These traits were selected because Alicke (1985) and Teasdale and 
Russell (1983) have included them as neutral characteristics in their studies, based on Anderson 
(1968) list of 555 likability ratings of personality traits.  The desirability scores were fabricated 
by me to emphasize its perceived negativity and neutrality of the results for identity threat and no 
threat conditions, respectively.      
After the manipulation, participants were asked to write down four traits that they 
believed to be indicative of a typical Chinese and rated how desirable they deemed each trait to 
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be.  They also responded to feelings thermometer scales as a measure of their attitudes toward 
U.S. Americans and Chinese.  Finally, all participants were fully debriefed on completion of the 
survey prior to proceeding to the raffle for the gift cards.  
Measures 
Cultural complexity.  The standard deviation of SCNQ scores was used to assess 
cultural complexity. 
American identification.  Participants reported their agreement to four statements of 
American identification on a 7-point Liker scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 
(Strongly agree).  The items were “I strongly identify with American culture,” “I am proud of 
being an American,” “I belong to American culture,” and “I like American culture” (Wan, Chiu, 
Tam, et al., 2007).  Wan, Chiu, Tam et al. found that participants’ American identification 
increased after core American values were made salient, lending support to its construct validity.  
They also reported the Cronbach alphas of the scale ranging from .91 to .97.  For the current 
study, the alpha was .89. 
Intergroup attitudes.  A feelings thermometer (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) was 
employed to measure intergroup bias.  Participants indicated their attitudes toward two groups 
(U.S. Americans and Chinese) on the widely used and validated feelings thermometer with 
responses ranging from 0 °C (extremely unfavorable) to 100 °C (extremely favorable; Hodson & 
Costello, 2007; Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008).  Ratings for U.S. Americans and 
Chinese reflected participants’ ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, respectively.  
Evidence of construct validity can be gathered from Turner et al. who found that outgroup 
attitudes as measured by a feelings thermometer were associated positively with cross-group 
friendship and negatively with intergroup anxiety. 
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Desirability of personality traits.  Participants were asked to write down four adjectives 
that they think can describe a typical Chinese.  Second, they reported the degree to which the 
adjectives were desirable on a 11-point Likert scale (0 = Bad to have, 5 = Neutral, 10 = Good to 
have; Alicke, 1985).  Participants’ desirability ratings on these four traits were averaged to form 
an index of outgroup perception, with higher scores representing more positive perception of 
outgroup members. 
Results 
I used the Free Statistics Calculators (Version 4.0; Soper, 2018) to acquire the minimum 
number of participants required for hierarchical multiple regression analyses, with the following 
criteria: power = .80, α = .05, and both a medium (f 2= .15) and a small effect sizes (f 2= .02).  I 
found that samples of 102 and 689 are required to detect a medium and a small effect sizes, 
respectively.  Therefore, the sample size of the current study of 211 was sufficient to detect only 
a medium effect size. 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to assess whether study variables differed as 
between gender, age, race, and socioeconomic status.  Results indicated that age was 
significantly correlated with feeling toward Americans (r = -.15, p < .05) and desirability of 
personality traits (r = .15, p < .05); socioeconomic status was significantly associated with 
feeling toward Americans (r = -.18, p < .01).  Thus, age and socioeconomic status were used as 
covariates in the regression analyses.  I also examined the correlations between endorsement of 
subjective cultural norms (based on mean scores from the SCNQ) and study variables.  
Replicating the result of Study 1, endorsement of subjective cultural norms was moderately and 
negatively linked to cultural complexity, r = -.43, p < .01.  Moreover, it was significantly and 
positively correlated with American identity and feelings toward U.S. Americans, rs = .54 
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and .24, respectively, both ps < .01.  I did not include endorsement of subjective cultural norms 
as a covariate because repeating the analyses with and without it indicated that the results were 
essentially identical. 
To handle missing values in the main study variables, I utilized the EM algorithm as in 
Study 1.  The percentage of missing data was less than 2.8%, and it appeared that data was 
missing completely at random, χ2(12) = 17.51, p = .13.  Hence, the EM algorithm was used to 
generate imputed values.  All subsequent analyses were conducted after imputation of missing 
data.  Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among the main variables are reported in Table 
3. 
Three hierarchical multiple regression analyses were performed with the criterion 
variables being (1) feelings towards ingroup (i.e., U.S. Americans), (2) feelings towards 
outgroup (i.e., Chinese; both as indicated by the feelings thermometer), and (3) cognitive 
evaluation of outgroup members.  In each model, age, socioeconomic status, and cultural 
identification were entered in the first step as control variables.  In Step 2, cultural complexity 
and condition (no identity threat, coded as 0, vs. identity threat, coded as 1) were added.  The 
interaction term between cultural complexity and condition was included in Step 3.  Visual 
inspection of scatter plots found no evidence of nonlinear relationships among cultural 
complexity the three outcome variables.  Residual normality assumption in regression was 
assessed.  Examination of the residuals indicated that normality assumption was held, as 
evidenced by histograms and P-P plots.  Furthermore, the skewness (-.58 to -.29) and kurtosis (-
0.12 to 1.36) of the residual scores did not indicate a significant departure from normal 
distribution.  Last, homoscedasticity appeared to be met as the variations across all predicted 
values were roughly equal.  To facilitate the interpretation of results, continuous predictors were 
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centered before entering the regression models.   
Effect of Experimental Manipulation on Dependent Measures 
To judge the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation, I compared the mean 
between no identity threat and identity threat conditions using independent samples t-tests.  
Participants in the identity threat condition reported slightly stronger, but not statistically 
significant, negative feelings toward Chinese people (t[209] = 1.72, p = .09) and significantly 
less favorable cognitive evaluation of Chinese people (t[209] = -3.64, p < .01).  No difference 
was found for feelings toward U.S. Americans (t[209] = -0.83, p = .41).   
Relationship between Cultural Complexity and Ingroup Favoritism 
The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 4.  The first hierarchical 
multiple regression model with feelings toward U.S. American as the criterion variable revealed 
that American identification was significantly and positively related to feelings toward U.S. 
Americans, and the R2 for the full model was also significant.  In Step 2, the entire model R2, but 
not ΔR2, was significant.  In terms of predictors, neither condition nor cultural complexity 
showed significant relationships with feelings toward Americans, ps = .48 and .08, 
respectively.  .  In Step 3, there was a null effect of the interaction between cultural complexity 
and condition.  Same as Step 2, the R2 for the full model was significant, p < .001, but not for 
ΔR2.  In short, results demonstrated that American identification, but not identity threat nor 
cultural complexity, was associated with enhanced ingroup favoritism. 
Relationship between Cultural Complexity and Outgroup Derogation 
I then turned to outgroup derogation, using feelings toward Chinese people and cognitive 
evaluation of Chinese people as two indicators.  In terms of the affective dimension of outgroup 
attitude, in Step 1, neither the full model nor the three variables was significant.  In Step 2, the 
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strength of association between condition and feelings toward Chinese people was close to 
significance (p = .09), showing a trend of less favorable feelings toward Chinese people in the 
identity threat condition relative to no identity threat condition.  Additionally, cultural 
complexity was associated with a warmer feeling toward Chinese people.  For this model, both 
R2 and ΔR2 were significant, with p = .02 and p < .001, respectively.  In Step 3, the full model R2 
was significant, but no interaction effect was found.  Although the expected interaction effect 
was not detected, the significant main effect of cultural complexity provided some evidence that 
it facilitates intergroup interaction through promoting a positive feeling toward an outgroup.  
Finally, with regard to the cognitive dimension of outgroup attitude, the R2 for Step 1 
appeared significant, with age being significantly and positively linked to a more favorable 
evaluation of Chinese people, whereas American identification showed a negative, albeit non-
significant, relationship (p = .07).  When condition and cultural complexity were entered into 
Step 2, they both significantly predicted cognitive evaluation of the outgroup: condition was 
correlated negatively while cultural complexity was associated positively with the criterion 
variable.  For this model, R2 (p < .001) and ΔR2 (p < .001) both reached significance.  Similar to 
the previous two regression models, the interaction term failed to show a significant relationship, 
so my moderation hypothesis was not supported.  However, the main effect of cultural 
complexity was again observed, lending support to another route through which cultural 
complexity benefits intergroup contact.   
Discussion 
Study 2 adopted an experimental design to test if U.S. college students’ cultural 
complexity would temper intergroup bias, manifesting as ingroup favoritism and/or outgroup 
derogation, when their ingroup identity was attacked.  Although I found no evidence buttressing 
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the moderation hypothesis of cultural complexity on identity threat, results from Study 2 
identified a main effect of cultural complexity and helped shed light on how cultural complexity 
operates in an intergroup context. 
First, Study 2 addressed a concern raised in Study 1. That is, a possible explanation of the 
null mediation effects of cultural complexity in U.S. student population pertains to the degree of 
saliency cultural knowledge is in one’s mind.  Study 2 rendered some empirical bases for this 
line of reasoning.  In Study 2, U.S. participants’ cultural identity was brought to the forefront by 
presenting them with an imagined, relevant racial outgroup (Chinese people) judging their 
ingroup identity (Wilder & Shapiro, 1984).  Under this manipulation, the role that cultural 
complexity played in intergroup bias emerged for U.S. participants—compared to individuals 
with low cultural complexity, those with higher cultural complexity were less biased against the 
outgroup, as evidenced by a significantly more positive attitude toward the outgroup on both 
affective and cognitive dimensions.  Interestingly, although not statistically significant, I 
observed a trend in which cultural complexity was positively linked to feelings toward ingroup.  
In hindsight, I surmised that in intergroup contexts, cultural complexity may be conducive to a 
more encompassing, balanced attitude where both ingroup and outgroup are equally valued, 
which may be functionally similar to the notion of dialecticism where opposing arguments can 
both be right. 
Second, it is noteworthy that cultural complexity was associated with reduced outgroup 
derogation (engendering a warmer feeling toward and forming a more favorable evaluation of 
outgroup members) rather than ingroup favoritism in an intergroup contact situation.  This 
finding stands in contrast with the literature on intergroup bias because the biases uncovered in 
social psychological research predominantly takes the form of mild ingroup favoritism instead of 
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outgroup derogation (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). 
Third, one possible explanation for the null finding of interaction effects is that threats 
tend to be instinctive and visceral, rendering them less responsive to the mitigating effect of 
cultural complexity.  Once individuals perceive a threat, a series of physiological reactions are 
triggered in the autonomic nervous system and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, such as the 
activation of amygdala, the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex left superior frontal gyrus, right 
anterior insula, caudate-nucleus accumbens hypothalamus (Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006).  
Regulating these threat responses may require cognitive resources (McRae et al., 2012) that 
exceed what cultural complexity has to offer. 
Collectively, although identity threat did not interact with cultural complexity to shape 
intergroup bias, cultural complexity itself was related to the reduction of intergroup bias for U.S. 
college students by countering the tendency to derogate outgroup members.  All in all, Studies 1 
and 2 attested to the validity of cultural complexity, suggesting that when culture knowledge is 
salient for both Chinese international students and U.S. college students, cultural complexity 
exerts its influences on culturally relevant psychological processes.  However, because my 
hypotheses were not uniformly supported, more empirical data is warranted.  Although Study 2 
utilized an experimental design, cultural identity threat, rather than cultural complexity, was 
manipulated. In Study 3, cultural complexity was manipulated to test its effects on a behavioral 
outcome in another cultural context. 
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Chapter IV: Study 3: Message Selection 
Given that Study 2 was an experimental design focusing on an attitudinal outcome, in 
Study 3, I sought to provide further evidence for the influence of cultural complexity through 
three means.  Methodologically, Study 3 employed an experimental design in which the level of 
cultural complexity was directly manipulated.  In so doing, a causal relationship between cultural 
complexity and the outcome variables could be established with more confidence.  
Measurement-wise, Study 3 extended Study 2 by examining the impact of cultural complexity on 
a behavioral dependent variable.  Finally, because Chinese participants in Study 1 were 
international students who were conceptually incomparable to U.S. domestic students 
participating in Study 2, Study 3 recruited Chinese college students in China to bolster the 
external validity of cultural complexity.   
I theorized that people with high cultural complexity, when facing a situation where their 
ingroup’s interests is at stake, would display a balanced way to approach the situation by seeking 
out information on both sides of the issue (i.e., considering opinions both in favor of and against 
one’s ingroup) rather than absorbing messages that selectively tout the merits of one side.  This 
is because cultural complexity may foster an open attitude towards understanding the strengths 
and weaknesses of one’s culture.  In addition, self-verification theory suggests that people prefer 
a social context that is in line with their self-views (Swann & Read, 1981); hence, individuals 
may also tend to navigate the information in their environment in ways consistent with their 
views on their culture.  Lastly, to the extent that cultural complexity represents a reflection on 
one’s culture that is motivated partially by a need for cognition, people high on cultural 
complexity would be more likely to engage in an effortful, systematic way of information 
processing, one that requires weighing both the pros and cons (Petty & Wegener, 1999). 
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To test these assumptions, participants in Study 3 were asked to read an article that 
explicitly delineated good and bad influences of one’s cultural tradition (experimental condition 
to induce cultural complexity) or an article that talked about the geography of one’s nation 
(control condition).  They then completed our measure of cultural complexity (i.e., the SCNQ) 
and chose from a list of news headlines that showcased either opinions supporting or against 
their the ingroup on a controversial topic.  First, I anticipated that participants in the 
experimental condition with balanced information about their ingroup culture would have higher 
levels of cultural complexity than those in the control condition.  Second, participants in the 
experimental condition would choose more balanced news headlines (i.e., a mix of headlines 
supporting and opposed to their ingroup) than those in the control condition.  Third, individual 
differences in cultural complexity (as measured by the SCNQ) would be positively correlated 
with selecting more balanced news headlines.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
A sample of 334 Chinese college students studying in a university in Southwest China 
were recruited for this study.  There were 19 students who opted not to take part in the study, 11 
participants who provided invalid responses to SCNQ, and 111 participants who dropped out 
after completing SCNQ, resulting in a final sample consisting of 193 participants: 117 identified 
as female (60.6%), 73 male (37.8%), and 3 other (1.6%); average age = 19.38 years, SD = 1.44.      
Professors in the university invited students who took a computer class to spend the first 
15 minutes of class time to complete the survey online.  Professors explicitly underscored the 
voluntary nature of participation and ensured anonymity for students.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the experimental or control conditions, followed by a writing 
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exercise and the SCNQ.  They were then exposed to two kinds of news headlines (pro-ingroup 
and anti-ingroup), with each kind containing six headlines, resulting in a total of 12 news 
headlines.  Selective exposure to these 12 news headlines serves as the dependent variable.  In 
particular, participants were first told that the session consisted of three different studies put 
together for administrative convenience.  The alleged purpose of the first study was to examine 
college students’ reading comprehension.  Participants in the cultural complexity (experimental) 
condition read an article discussing one positive and one negative influences of Confucianism on 
Chinese society.  Specifically, the positive feature chosen was Confucian ethics, where the article 
elaborated on how the virtues extoled by Confucianism can still serve as a valuable guide today.  
On the other hand, the negative feature focused on the ways in which interpersonal hierarchy 
emphasized in Confucianism hampers individuality and creativity.  For participants in the control 
condition, they read an article introducing the geography of China (e.g., China has great physical 
diversity. The east and south of the country consists of fertile lowlands and foothills, and is the 
location of most of China’s agricultural output and human population; see Appendix M).  All 
participants were required to complete a short writing exercise to summarize what they learned 
from the article they read, which in reality served as a manipulation check as well as a way to 
strengthen the effect of manipulation. 
Next, participants were told that the second study was about introducing Chinese cultural 
norms to a foreigner who knows nothing about China.  Participants then completed SCNQ. 
The third study was presented as a visual design study to examine people’s browsing 
patterns of a beta version of an online magazine (a procedure modified from Knobloch-
Westerwick & Meng, 2009, and Sawicki et al., 2013).  Specifically, participants were shown an 
experimental Internet news magazine created to look like those available on the World Wide 
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Web (Figure 2).  A part of the magazine contained 12 news headlines (ranging from 19 to 25 
words in Chinese, see Appendix L) pertaining to a territorial dispute in the South China Sea.  All 
headlines clearly indicated the stance taken on the claim that China has sovereignty over the 
South China Sea, which can be easily be classified into one of the two camps: six arguments in 
favor of China’s claim (pro-China) and the remaining six arguments against China’s claim (anti-
China).  Examples of headlines were: “The reason why China owns the South China Sea: 
Historical review and pragmatic considerations (pro-China)” and “Does China own South China 
Sea? Historical analysis undermines the credibility of China’s claim (anti-China).”  Participants’ 
clicking on each headline was recorded unobtrusively by the system. 
Participants were asked to check off the news headlines they were interested in reading.  
During this process, participants did not know whether or not they will have to read the chosen 
articles in their entirety later.  In other words, participants chose the headlines without any 
explicit instruction as to whether they would be provided with the reading content associated 
with the news headlines or not (modeled after Sawicki et al., 2013).  Moreover, a time limit of 
one minute was be imposed.  This was meant to create a sense of time pressure, as time pressure 
was likely to induce need for closure, which would in turn heighten the inclination of attitude-
congruent information exposure (Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000; Smith, Fabrigar, Powell, 
& Estrada, 2007).  Participants were instructed as follows: 
“You will see a test version of an online magazine.  Please first browse through to gain an 
impression of the content of the website, and then check off the news headlines that interest you, 
just as you normally would.  Please select at least one news headline. However, please do NOT 
click on all the news headlines. Select only those that interest you. Most people need 3 minutes 
to do it, but you only have 1 minute.  Try to do it fast.  We will remind you every 15 seconds.  
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After the scheduled browsing time is over, a questionnaire will upload automatically so you can 
evaluate the magazine.” 
Additionally, two variables were included as control variables, as past research has 
documented their effects on attitude-congruent information seeking.  The first was frequency of 
news use (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009), and the other was knowledge about a given 
topic (Chiu et al., 2000; Sawicki et al., 2013).   
Measures 
Manipulation check.  First, I reviewed the written responses to ensure that the content 
was relevant to the article participants read.  Second, participants reported the extent to which 
they paid attention to the articles on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 being Not at all to 5 being 
Completely.  Third, participants indicated how well they understood the articles and were also 
asked to guess the purpose of the study at the end.  Finally, I compared the mean cultural 
complexity scores in the two conditions. 
Cultural complexity.  The SCNQ was employed to assess cultural complexity. 
Balanced exposure to information.  The index of balanced exposure was created.  First, 
I calculated the absolute difference between the number of anti-China headline choices and the 
number of pro-China headline choices, divided by the total number of chosen headlines 
(modified from Sawicki et al., 2013, Study 1).  The resultant value ranged from 0 (the same 
number of anti- and pro-China headlines were chosen) to 1 (only anti- or pro-China headlines 
were chosen).  To make the index more intuitively comprehensible, I deducted the value from 1, 
so the closer the value is to 1, the more balanced the perspective one adopts on the issue.  For 
example, a participant who chose one pro-China and three anti-China new headlines would 
obtain the value of .50 (1 - |1-3| / 4 = .5); one pro-China and zero anti-China news headlines 
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would have a value of 0 (1 - |1-0| / 1 = 0). 
News use.  Because habitual news use has been shown to be a strong predictor of 
preference for attitude-consistent messages and avoidance of counter-attitudinal articles 
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009), this variable was included as a control variable.  
Participants rated their news use frequency for online news, daily newspaper, TV news, political 
Web sites, and talk or comedy shows about news and politics on a 6-point scale, with every day, 
several times a week, once a week, several times a month, once a month, and less often as 
response options.  These five items were condensed into an index for habitual news use 
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009).  The Cronbach’s alpha was .63. 
Knowledge of the topic.  Participants indicated the extent to which they “know about the 
sovereignty dispute over the South China Sea” using a 7-point Likert type scale (1 = Not at all, 7 
= Very much). 
Results 
A power analysis on linear multiple regression using G*Power 3.1.3 (Faul et al., 2009) 
revealed that a sample size of 77 participants was sufficient to detect a medium effect size 
(f2= .15), assuming power = 0.80 and α = .05.  Hence, the sample size of this study rendered 
adequate power.  
I tested whether participants’ demographics differed in balanced exposure to information.  
The result of t tests identified no significant differences between genders in the dependent 
variable, neither did age and socioeconomic status correlate with balanced exposure to 
information.  Little’s missing completely at random test suggested that data were missing 
completely at random, χ2(8) = 6.52, p = .59.  Missing data for main variables (5.7% for cultural 
complexity and 1% for knowledge of the topic) were imputed using the EM algorithm. 
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Main Analyses 
My first hypothesis that the experimental manipulation would induce greater levels of 
cultural complexity was not supported, t(191) = .30, p = .78.  That is, experimental and control 
conditions had comparable levels of cultural complexity.  To ensure that the lack of manipulation 
effect was not due to participants’ inattention to the article and their inability to understand the 
concepts, I reran a t-test with the inclusion criteria that participants had to report at least a 3 (out 
of 5 points) on the two items on attention paid to and levels of comprehension of the articles.  
The decision of adopting at least a 3 on a 5-point scale self-reported validity check item was 
suggested by Wang, Wong, Yeh, and Wang (2018).  Data from 57 participants were dropped as a 
result, although the result of the experimental manipulation was still insignificant, t(134) = .45, p 
= .66.   
Before testing the second and third hypotheses, I examined if assumptions of multiple 
regression were held for the data.  Visual inspection of the outcome variable revealed that the 
data was highly positively skewed, skewness = 1.42.  Shapiro-Wilk test also indicated a 
departure from normality, p < .01.  Furthermore, the skewness (1.29) of the residual score 
suggested a significant violation of normal distribution.  For these reasons, I abandoned the 
proposed hierarchical multiple regression and reformulated another dependent variable to capture 
information processing pattern. 
A closer look on the dependent variable showed that the vast majority of participants in 
Study 3 demonstrated a biased information preference pattern where 143 (74.1%) people had a 
value of 0 (recall that the lower value reflected a more biased way of selecting the news 
headlines).  Of these individuals, 119 (83.2%) chose one or more pro-ingroup headlines, whereas 
only 24 (16.8%) chose one or more anti-ingroup headlines.  Two conclusions can be made based 
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on the finding.  First, considering opinions from both sides of an argument concerning ingroup is 
a cognitively taxing task that people are less likely to engage in.  Second, there clearly existed a 
strong preference to receive information consistent with the interest of one’s ingroup.  As such, I 
transformed the variable into a binary one.  The first category comprised of individuals who 
displayed a balanced way of information processing style where at least one news headline in 
both pro-ingroup and anti-ingroup was chosen (coded as 1).  The second category referred to 
individuals who navigated information in a biased way by exposing themselves to either pro-
ingroup or anti-ingroup news headlines (coded as 0). 
Using this outcome variable, I performed a hierarchical logistic regression with two steps 
to address the second and third hypotheses.  News use and knowledge of the topic were entered 
in the first step as control variables.  In the second step, experimental condition (0 = control, 1 = 
experimental) and individual differences in cultural complexity were added.  The outcome 
variable was the binary variable of balanced exposure to news headlines (0 = biased, 1 = 
balanced).  Since there was no difference in cultural complexity between control and 
experimental conditions whether or not the inclusion criteria were applied, all valid data was 
included in the analysis (N = 193).  I created 5,000 bootstrap samples using random sampling 
with replacement and reported robust estimates accordingly.  Descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the regression model is presented in Table 5, and the results of logistic 
regression based on the bootstrap samples in Table 6. 
In Step 1, the regression model was not significant, χ2(2, N = 193) = 1.73, p = .42.  
Neither news use nor knowledge about the topic predicted pattern of news headline selection.  In 
Step 2, the entire model remained insignificant χ2(4, N = 193) = 6.55, p = .16, Nagelkerke R2 
= .05, but the step approached significance, χ2(2, N = 193) = 4.82, p = .09.  This final model 
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correctly classified 76.2% of participants (100% of those who exhibited biased information 
seeking and 8% of those who displayed balanced information seeking).  The results showed that 
only the main effect of cultural complexity was significant, B = .48, OR = 1.61, p < .05.  As 
reflected in Table 6, the odds ratio indicated that the likelihood of individuals considering 
processing both pro-ingroup and anti-ingroup information increased by .61, or 61%, for every 
one unit increase in cultural complexity.  Stated differently, participants were .61 times as likely 
to demonstrate balanced exposure to information as scores related to cultural complexity 
increased by one.  In sum, these findings support the third, but not the second, hypothesis.  
Discussion 
Study 3’s findings generally corroborated the hypothesis that in the face of one’s 
ingroup’s interest being jeopardized, people with high cultural complexity are more willing to 
look at both sides of an issue, whereas those with low cultural complexity are inclined to 
selective information seeking, predominantly messages in line with ingroup’s interest.  Counter 
to my predictions and past literature, the manipulation of information about their ingroup culture 
did not influence levels of cultural complexity and the likelihood of selecting balanced 
information.  Furthermore, Study 3 revealed that there was a substantial inclination of biased 
information seeking, defined as exposing only to information that touts the benefits of either the 
pro or con side of the controversy.  In fact, this tendency was so strong that my initially 
formulated index to capture patterns of exposure to information was changed from a continuous 
variable to a categorical one.  Considering the strength of biased information seeking, the fact 
that cultural complexity emerged as a significant predictor of a balanced pattern in navigating 
information seems to attest to its practical importance. 
To sum up, although the manipulation unexpectedly failed and the outcome variable was 
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reconceptualized as dichotomous, this study, at the very least, provided further evidence of the 
validity of cultural complexity by adopting a behavioral outcome measure t high in ecological 
validity and using a different sample.   
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Chapter V: General Discussion 
Past research on cultural norms has focused mainly on people’s responses to a set of 
predetermined scale items.  The present research expands the horizon of the social norm 
approach to cultural psychological research in two major ways.  First, I call attention to the 
construct of cultural complexity (as measured by the standard deviation score of the SCNQ—that 
is, individuals with high cultural complexity construe their culture from a balanced point of view 
that consists of both positive and negative evaluations.  Second, I adopt the subjective approach 
to assessing cultural complexity—individuals report the norms that they believe are widespread 
in their culture.  Across three studies with samples of two nationals from different contexts, I 
elucidated the nature of cultural complexity and demonstrated the role it plays in determining 
attitudes and behavior in the process of intercultural contacts.   
Findings from Study 1 documented that certain cognitive styles (dialecticism, need for 
cognition, and need for closure) and the personality trait of openness to experience were 
positively correlated with cultural complexity, which was, in turn, associated with qualities that 
have been found to contribute to positive intercultural contact outcomes, including cultural 
humility (Caligiuri, Baytalskaya, & Lazarova, 2016), decreased cultural superiority (Klak & 
Martin, 2003), less entitative thinking about culture (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006), 
and increased interactions with racial/ethnic outgroups (Zagefka et al., 2017).  Upon a closer 
look, the theorized antecedents of cultural complexity seem to converge on the theme of a 
preference for intellectual pursuit and comfort in ambiguity, which are antithetical to need for 
closure.  Indeed, Webster and Kruglanski (1994) discussed need for closure as a latent variable 
that takes the form of preference for predictability, desire for order, averse of ambiguity, close-
mindedness, and decisiveness.  This particular epistemic constellation not only prompts 
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individuals to resort to categorical thinking, but also undermines their ability to recognize 
heterogeneity (Brauer & Er-Rafiy, 2011).  As theorized earlier, cultural complexity requires 
effortful cognitive processing and a sophisticated cognitive representation of culture (not a 
wholesale good or bad), so it is not surprising that the data supported the proposed individual 
difference variables as antecedents. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the nomological network showed that the findings for the 
mediation models were different for U.S. and Chinese college students.  Among the 16 
mediation models, cultural complexity was a significant mediator in 13 models for Chinese 
participants but none for U.S. participants.  Perhaps the theorized effect of cultural complexity is 
more evident when culture becomes a salient construct.  In Study 1, all Chinese participants were 
international students, so there may exist a unique situational factor that differentiated them from 
U.S. domestic participants.  Research has shown that international students’ heritage cultural 
identity is more likely to be brought to mind because of their sojourn in a foreign cultural 
environment where they are confronted with numerous aspects of culture shock (Kashima & 
Loh, 2006; Sussman, 2002).  In addition, their minority status makes them distinctive, drawing 
attention to their cultural identity and thus contributing to the dominant role that culture plays in 
their mind (Roccas & Brewer, 2002).  As such, this situational factor is likely to increase 
international students’ current accessibility of culture, rendering cultural complexity a 
meaningful construct (see also Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009). 
Following this line of reasoning, Study 2 made salient U.S. participants’ cultural identity 
by presenting an imagined outgroup of Chinese individuals.  Against this backdrop, the effect of 
cultural complexity was also observed for U.S. Americans, providing evidence that cultural 
complexity may facilitate cultural psychological processes during intergroup contact only when 
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culture becomes cognitively accessible to individuals.  Although cultural complexity did not 
interact with identity threats, the significant main effects of cultural complexity on how one 
appraises a typical outgroup member and how warm one feels toward an outgroup further attest 
to the findings from Study 1 that cultural complexity benefits cross-group friendship through 
positive attitudes toward outgroup members.  Past research has proposed the bidirectional 
relationship between prejudices (both implicit and explicit) and intergroup contact (Aberson, 
Shoemaker, & Tomolillo, 2004; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).  In this study, I highlighted the idea 
that, besides people’s attitudes toward outgroups, the way they think about their own culture also 
plays a role in determining their interactions with outgroup members. 
Finally, Study 3 revealed that cultural complexity positively predicted a behavioral 
outcome on balanced information processing.  In the context where their ingroup’s interest was 
at stake, Chinese participants demonstrated a strong preference for messages that favor their 
ingroup.  According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), humans interact with each 
other on a spectrum with one end being purely interpersonal and the other extreme being purely 
intergroup.  As people move closer to the intergroup end of the spectrum, idiosyncratic qualities 
are obscured by the salience of their group memberships.  As a result, individuals become 
exchangeable with their groups, which then activates a different level of self-concept (Hornsey, 
2008).  Moreover, because of the need to maintain a positive self-concept, individuals are also 
motivated to evaluate their groups positively when comparing with other groups.  Driven by this 
motivated cognition, Chinese nationals in this study may thus be inclined to receive information 
that helped them defend the ingroup, or their collective self-esteem.  I demonstrated that cultural 
complexity was able to counter this mindset, enhancing the possibility that a participant chose 
both pro- and anti-ingroup information.   
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It is puzzling that the experimental manipulation of cultural complexity in Study 3 did not 
turn out to be effective.  Perhaps there was a misfit between the level of experimental 
manipulation (a written article) and the measurement of cultural complexity.  More specifically, 
the manipulation focused explicitly on developing a comprehensive argument on a good and a 
bad aspect of participants’ culture.  In contrast, cultural complexity was measured indirectly in 
this study through the use of variability in response to the SCNQ.  Hence, the article was directed 
at a propositional mode of information processing, leaving intact people’s implicit expression of 
cultural complexity (Gawronski & Strack, 2004).  Another possible reason is that cultural 
complexity may possess trait-like attributes that make it less susceptible to brief manipulations 
like the one used in this study.  Inspired by the research on bicultural identity integration (the 
degree to which two cultural identities is integrated by bicultural individuals; Benet-Martinez, 
Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Mok & Morris, 2012), I further conjectured that cultural complexity 
may also be better understood as a relatively enduring disposition from which there is some 
degree of deviation.   
Strengths of the Study 
This project contributes to the cultural and counseling psychology literature in several 
ways.  First, it introduces a new cultural construct of cultural complexity and provides empirical 
evidence to document its nomological network and the condition under which it becomes 
relevant.  The findings not only confirmed the utility and distinctiveness of cultural complexity, 
but also supported the conceptualization of cultural complexity as a desirable attribute that yields 
several benefits conducive to positive group processes, both at the intragroup level (e.g., a 
humble representation of one’s ingroup and a balanced information selection pattern) and the 
intergroup level (e.g., reduced outgroup derogation when group identity was threatened). 
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Second, I deployed a unique method to capture individual differences in cultural 
complexity that is characterized as subjective and implicit without resorting to traditional 
implicit measures, such as the implicit association test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  
The methodological advantages of allowing participants to describe their own cultural norms and 
using the standard deviation of endorsement scores as the index of cultural complexity obscure 
the intention of the measure.  Therefore, compared to self-reported responses to cultural 
complexity, I argue that the standard deviation approach with the SCNQ would be more 
insensitive to social desirability threat. 
Third, this research includes diverse methodologies (research designs, outcome 
measures) and samples (Chinese participants as sojourners in the U.S. and as domestic students 
in China, as well as U.S. college students) to support the validity of cultural complexity.  
Although my hypotheses were only partially supported across three studies, evidence from 
different research designs, outcomes, and samples converged, giving more credence to the 
conclusions made regarding the salutary effects of cultural complexity, 
Fourth, my findings on cultural complexity bridge and expand two lines of literature: the 
social norm approach to culture (Morris et al., 2015) and the rich body of research on intergroup 
contact.  For instance, the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology has devoted a special issue to 
integrate recent theories and research on social norms and intersubjective representations, with 
the foci on the cultural norm transmission process and psychological functions of norms (Lonner, 
Zou, & Leung; 2015).  What appears to be lacking in this discussion is the implications of 
cultural norms on intergroup/intercultural processes.  This research draws attention to how a 
specific configuration of cultural norms and personal beliefs (characterized by both high 
agreement and disagreement) affects intergroup dynamics in the attitudinal and behavioral facets. 
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Limitations and Future Research Directions 
There are some notable limitations of the present set of studies.  First, a convincing case 
regarding the causality between the variables in the present studies cannot be built because of the 
cross-sectional, correlational designs and the failure to manipulate cultural complexity.  
Although the data for the most part are consistent with my theoretical model and predictions (i.e., 
the nomological network of cultural complexity, the benefits of cultural complexity on reducing 
prejudice and biased information processing), there are other theoretical models that may also 
explain the data well, including one that would suggest that cultural complexity and all the 
dependent variables concerning intergroup processes might be affected by dialectical thinking 
(Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2012).  I therefore encourage future researchers to directly 
investigate the causal impact of cultural complexity by using longitudinal and experimental 
designs.  One possible alternative to manipulate cultural complexity may be focusing on its 
antecedents as a way to impact cultural complexity.  For example, Miller, Brewer, and Arbuckle, 
(2009) manipulated social identity complexity by increasing or decreasing people’s need for 
elaboration, an antecedent of the construct of interest.  Similarly, Mok and Morris (2012) 
changed biculturals’ cognitive processing style to affect their degree of bicultural identity 
integration.  Future studies can explore if well-established procedures of manipulating dialectical 
thinking, a proposed precursor to cultural complexity, would be an effective way to influence 
cultural complexity. 
Second, based on the differences in findings for the Chinese and U.S. samples in Study 1, 
I theorized that the effects of cultural complexity might be most prominent when culture 
becomes cognitively accessible.  Although cultural saliency was presumably high in Studies 2 
and 3, we did not directly assess cultural saliency.  Instead, it was inferred from past research and 
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theories on group and intergroup processes.  The interaction assumption between cultural 
complexity and cognitive accessibility needs to be addressed clearly to understand fully how 
cultural complexity works.   
The third limitation is related to the ongoing discussion on moderators of cultural 
complexity.  Although I demonstrated that cultural complexity reduced biases for both U.S. and 
Chinese nationals when their ingroup was threatened, my sample was not sufficiently diverse to 
test if cultural complexity exerts the same influences for other racial groups (e.g., African 
Americans), especially in a society where these groups are marginalized to different degrees and 
vary widely on their perceived warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).  It is 
conceivable that high cultural complexity could lead to cultural humility for racial majority 
groups but not so much for racial minorities because of experiences of discrimination. 
Finally, as implied in the previous point, the two characteristics of cultural complexity, 
namely, variability and subjectivity, could be applied to the study of other social identities in 
psychology.  An interesting line of research could be the parallel constructs of cultural 
complexity in the psychology of men and women, such as “men/women identity complexity,” 
where an individual is able to notice both positive and negative aspects of his/her gender 
membership. 
Practical Implications 
The findings of the present set of studies have several implications for therapy training 
programs and therapy practice.  First, when training therapists to competently work with clients 
from various backgrounds, it may be critical to cultivate therapists’ ability to reflect on their 
cultural identities in a balanced way.  Training programs that focus on facilitating therapists’ 
awareness as cultural beings are advised to explicitly teach therapists to explore both positive 
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and negative aspects of their identities.  Take the Social Identity Wheel exploration activity as an 
example (Adams, Bell, & Griffin, 2007).  This activity is commonly used to prompt therapists-
in-training to engage in discussions around their social identities (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, 
socioeconomic status, age) as well as their privileges and oppression.  This activity can be 
expanded to include a structured discussion on the good and bad norms associated with each 
identity.  Because cultural complexity necessitates the dual capacities of naming prevalent 
cultural norms and evaluating them, I reason that as therapists’ cultural complexity increases, 
there will be a spillover effect on other multicultural skills.  For example, therapists may be more 
likely to develop sensitivity to cultural differences without overemphasizing them (Stuart, 2004) 
due to the realization that people from a specific cultural background may not necessarily 
endorse all the norms in their own culture. 
Moreover, it also seems important to engage clients in a journey of exploring their culture 
in a balanced way as well, especially for clients who tend to universally embrace or reject their 
culture.  This mindset may subject clients to psychological consequences that prevent them from 
effectively participate in rewarding intercultural exchanges (Neuliep, 2012).  In practice, how 
psychotherapists achieve this goal may bear some resemblance to cognitive behavior 
interventions and mindfulness-based principles—therapists could challenge dichotomous 
thinking (e.g., my culture is either totally good or bad) and invite clients to take a step back to 
reflect on the dominant norms in their culture.  I surmise that this practice would increase clients’ 
multicultural competence in an increasingly diverse society and enhance their social well-being. 
Conclusion 
When I ask people to tell me about their cultures, I am often intrigued by those whose 
cognitive representation of their cultural is characterized by the coexistence of good and bad 
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evaluations.  However, it is striking to me that I could not locate a construct in the cultural 
psychology literature to match this anecdotal but common response.  This research examined the 
nomological network of cultural complexity and how it potentially yields benefits in an 
intergroup context.  Across three studies, I provide evidence that cultural complexity may be a 
beneficial psychological construct that fosters a humble attitude and openness in an intercultural 
context.  I also show that cultural complexity mitigates not only prejudice toward outgroups, but 
also bias in information processing.  With this line of research, it is promising that we promote a 
respectful climate in a multicultural society by harnessing the positive outcomes that come with a 
balanced perspective toward one’s ingroup.   
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Table 3 
Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges, and Intercorrelations among Main Variables (N 
= 211) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. US cultural identity                                                  
2. Cultural complexity -.28**     
3. Feeling towards ingroup .44** -.03    
4. Feeling towards outgroup -.04 .22** .13+   
5. Cognitive evaluation of outgroup -.14+ .23** -.08 .52**  
M 4.97 1.24 72.20 64.83 6.48 
SD 1.44 0.83 18.13 19.52 2.17 
Possible Range 1-7 0-3.29 0-100 0-100 0-10 
+p = .053. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Table 4  
Study 2: Multiple Regression Models Predicting Intergroup Biases 
 
Note. If two p values are presented, they indicate p values for R2 and ΔR2, respectively.  
  
Variable B SE  β R2 ΔR2 p 
  
Outcome: Feelings towards ingroup 
Step 1    .21  <.001 
  Age -0.34 0.20 -.11   .09 
  SES -0.87 0.67 -.08   .19 
  US cultural identity  5.22 0.80 .41   <.001 
Step 2    .23 .01 <.001, .17 
  Condition                                              1.61 2.25 .04   .48 
  Cultural complexity 2.47 1.42 .11   .08 
Step 3    .23 .00 <.001, .54 
  Condition × cultural complexity 1.70 2.80 .06   .54 
  
Outcome: Feelings towards outgroup 
Step 1    .00  .82 
  Age -0.02 0.24 -.01   .93 
  SES 0.63 0.81 .06   .44 
  US cultural identity  -0.39 0.96 -.03   .68 
Step 2    .07 .06 .02, <.001 
  Condition                                              -4.52 2.66 -.12   .09 
  Cultural complexity 5.42 1.68 .23   <.001 
Step 3    .07 .00 .03, .55 
  Condition × cultural complexity 1.94 3.28 .06   .55 
  
Outcome: Cognitive evaluation of outgroup 
Step 1    .04  .04 
  Age 0.05 0.03 .14   .04 
  SES -0.04 0.09 -.03   .69 
  US cultural identity  -0.20 0.11 -.13   .07 
Step 2    .14 .11 <.001, <.001 
  Condition                                              -1.12 0.28 -.26   <.001 
  Cultural complexity 0.57 0.18 .22   <.001 
Step 3    .14 .00 <.001, .96 
  Condition × cultural complexity 0.02 0.35 .00   .96 
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Table 5 
Study 3: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Logistic Regression (N = 193) 
Information 
processing 
Total 
sample (n) News use Knowledge 
Experimental 
conditions 
Cultural 
complexity 
M SD M SD Ctrl (n) Exp (n) M SD 
Biased                                              143 2.83 0.08 4.51 0.10 74 69 0.59 0.05 
Balanced 50 2.75 0.14 4.23 0.21 24 26 0.87 0.13 
Summary 193 2.81 0.96 4.43 1.26 98 95 0.66 0.75 
Note. Ctrl = control condition. Exp = cultural complexity condition. 
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Table 6  
Study 3: Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for the Prediction of Balanced Information 
Processing (N = 193) 
 
  
Variable B SE B OR 95% CI [LL, UL] p 
Step 1      
  News use -0.02 0.19 0.98 [-.41, .33] .91 
  Knowledge about the topic -0.17 0.17 0.85 [-.51, .14] .23 
Step 2      
  Experimental conditions 0.14 0.35 1.15 [-.55, .82] .68 
  Cultural complexity 0.48 0.23 1.61 [.03, .92] .03 
 89 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. A mediation model of cultural complexity. + and – denote positive and negative 
associations with cultural complexity, respectively.  
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Figure 2. The online magazine website used in Study 3. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
The Subjective Cultural Norms Questionnaire 
 
The following statements are about social norms concerning American [Chinese] culture.  These 
social norms include societal customs and expectations about what members in American 
[Chinese] culture should or should not do.  We’re interested in your understanding of the most 
important social norms concerning members in American [Chinese] culture.  The focus of these 
statements is on what most people believe; you may or may not personally endorse these social 
norms.  Please describe these social norms by completing the following sentences.  Do NOT 
include expectations that are required by law (e.g., the law stipulating citizens to pay taxes in 
America [China]; the law forbidding stealing in America [China]). 
 
Social Norm 1: In American [Chinese] culture, most people believe that individuals should 
________ 
 
Social Norm 2: In American [Chinese] culture, most people believe that individuals should 
________ 
 
Social Norm 3: In American [Chinese] culture, most people believe that individuals should 
________ 
 
Social Norm 4: In American [Chinese] culture, most people believe that individuals should NOT 
________ 
 
Social Norm 5: In American [Chinese] culture, most people believe that individuals should NOT 
________ 
 
Social Norm 6: In American [Chinese] culture, most people believe that individuals should NOT 
________ 
 
Indicate the extent to which you personally endorse or agree with each of the social norms 
you’ve just described concerning members in American [Chinese] culture.  For example, if you 
wrote that people believe members in American [Chinese] culture should eat vegetables, indicate 
the extent to which you agree that members in American [Chinese] culture should eat vegetables. 
 
Social Norm 1:  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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Social Norm 2: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Social Norm 3: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Social Norm 4: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Social Norm 5: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Social Norm 6: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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Appendix B 
 
The Brief Dialectical Self Scale 
 
Listed below are a number of statements about your thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Select the 
number that best matches your agreement or disagreement with each statement. Use the 
following scale, which ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). There are no right 
or wrong answers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. I am the same around my family as I am around my friends.* 
2. When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with both. 
3. I often change the way I am, depending on who I am with.    
4. I often find that things will contradict each other. 
5. If I’ve made up my mind about something, I stick to it.* 
6. I have a definite set of beliefs, which guide my behavior at all times.* 
7. I have a strong sense of who I am and don’t change my views when others disagree with 
me.* 
8. The way I behave usually has more to do with immediate circumstances than with my 
personal preferences. 
9. My outward behaviors reflect my true thoughts and feelings.*      
10. I sometimes believe two things that contradict each other. 
11. I often find that my beliefs and attitudes will change under different contexts. 
12. My world is full of contradictions that cannot be resolved. 
13. I am constantly changing and am different from one time to the next. 
14. I usually behave according to my principles.* 
*reverse scored 
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Appendix C 
 
The Revised Need for Cognition Scale 
 
For each of the statements below, please use the following scale to indicate whether or not the 
statement is characteristic of you or of what you believe. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.* 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities.* 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in 
depth about something.* 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to.* 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.* 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.* 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.* 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort.* 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.* 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
 
*reverse scored 
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Appendix D 
 
The 40-Item Mini Marker Set - Openness Subscale 
 
How accurately can you describe yourself? 
Please use this list of common human traits to describe yourself as accurately as possible. 
Describe yourself as you see yourself at the present time, not as you wish to be in the future. 
Describe yourself as you are generally or typically, as compared with other persons you know of 
the same sex and of roughly your same age. 
Before each trait, please write a number indicating how accurately that trait describes you, using 
the following rating scale: 
Inaccurate  Accurate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Extremely Very  Moderately  Slightly ? Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
 
1. Creative 
2. Imaginative 
3. Philosophical 
4. Intellectual 
5. Complex 
6. Deep 
7. Uncreative 
8. Unintellectual 
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Appendix E 
 
Brief Need for Closure Scale 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to 
your beliefs and experiences. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. I don’t like situations that are uncertain. 
2. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
3. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
4. I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my life. 
5. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes. 
6. I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
7. When I have made a decision, I feel relieved. 
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly. 
9. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a problem 
immediately. 
10. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
11. I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things. 
12. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
13. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
14. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view. 
15. I dislike unpredictable situations. 
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Appendix F 
 
The Measure of Identification with Groups - Superiority Subscale 
 
Use the following scale to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following 
items. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. Other nations can learn a lot from us Americans [Chinese]. 
2. Compared to other nations, America [China] is particularly good. 
3. Relative to other groups, we (Americans) [Chinese] are very moral. 
4. America [China] is better than other nations in all respects. 
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Appendix G 
 
The Abbreviated Specific Intellectual Humility Scale 
 
Here are a number of statements that may or may not apply to you. For the most accurate score, 
when responding, think of how you compare to most people—not just the people you know well, 
but most people in the world. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer honestly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. My views about American [Chinese] culture today may someday turn out to be wrong. 
2. When it comes to my views about American [Chinese] culture, I may be overlooking 
evidence. 
3. My views about American [Chinese] culture may change with additional evidence or 
information. 
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Appendix H 
 
Cultural Essentialism Scale 
 
We have collected a sample of people’s ideas about ‘culture’ below.  Sometimes, ideas about 
“culture” can be quite abstract. We are interested in knowing what you think about the following 
ideas relating to culture. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neutral Slightly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. Culture is a central aspect of a person’s personality; it defines who you are. 
2. People who belong to a different culture are a distinct type of person. 
3. It is easy to change somebody’s culture: it is not a fixed attribute of the person.* 
4. Culture has broad ramifications: it influences people’s behavior in a wide variety of 
situations and in many aspects of their lives. 
5. People will tend to follow their cultural norms and customs in a consistent manner, in 
different situations and with different people. 
6. Culture is a deeply-rooted part of the personality: it lies deep within the person. 
7. Cultural groups are just arbitrary categories.* 
8. Culture is a social construct and has no real bearing on how people interact.* 
9. Culture helps determine differences in people’s behavior. 
10. When meeting a new person it is important for me to know what culture they are from. 
11. If I knew someone was from a different culture, I would mention this in describing them to 
someone else. 
12. Culture does not have an inherent biological basis.* 
13. It is hard, if not impossible, to change the basic qualities associated with a person’s culture. 
14. I change my behavior depending on which culture the person I am interacting with is from. 
15. What a person is like (e.g., his or her abilities, traits) is deeply ingrained by their culture. 
*reverse scored 
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Appendix J 
 
Histograms Used in Study 2 
 
Identity Threat Condition: 
 
 
No Threat Condition: 
 
 
95.2%
94.3%
92.8%
90.9%
88.0%
90.0%
92.0%
94.0%
96.0%
Arrogant (0.5) Ignorant (1.1) Annoying (1.2) Materialistic (1.8)
*Numbers in the parentheses:
0 (Bad to have) ------ 5 (Neutral) ------ 10 (Good to have)
Chinese Participants' Perception of Americans
95.2%
94.3%
92.8%
90.9%
88.0%
90.0%
92.0%
94.0%
96.0%
Bold (5.4) Proud (5.6) Excitable (5.1) Normal (5.5)
*Numbers in the parentheses:
0 (Bad to have) ------- 5 (Neutral) ------- 10 (Good to have)
Chinese Participants' Perception of Americans
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Appendix K 
 
Feelings Thermometers 
 
Below you will see something that looks like a thermometer.  We would like you to use the 
thermometer to indicate your overall attitude towards Chinese and American, respectively.  If 
you have a favorable attitude towards Chinese, you would give them a score somewhere between 
50° and 100°, depending on how favorable you are toward them. If you have an unfavorable 
attitude towards Chinese, you would give them a score somewhere between 0° and 50°, 
depending on how unfavorable you are toward them. The degree labels will help you to locate 
the group on the thermometer. However, you are not restricted to the numbers indicated—feel 
free to use any number between 0° and 100°. Please be honest. 
 
Chinese: 
 
 
 
Americans: 
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Appendix L 
 
News Headlines Used in Study 3 
Pro-China: 
 
中国拥有南海主权的理由：历史回顾与现实思考 
The reason why China owns South China Sea: Historical review and pragmatic considerations 
中国外交部指称南海争议根源於中国领土被侵占 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC states that the dispute over South China Sea stems from 
Chinese territory being occupied 
欧洲华文媒体集体发声支持中国南海问题立场 
European Chinese media issues a collective statement supporting China’s stance in the South 
China Sea dispute 
芝加哥时报社论：支持中国南海统治权，否认南海仲裁 
Chicago Times editorial: Supporting China’s ownership claim over South China Sea, rejecting 
tribunal’s ruling in South China Sea case 
南海主权归属中国符合国际法理之规范 
China’s sovereignty over South China Sea is in conformity with the International Law 
俄罗斯总统支持中国南海主张，反对国际干涉 
President of Russia supports China’s claims of South China Sea, opposing the international 
interference   
 
Anti-China: 
 
中国拥有南海主权？历史分析指出中国主张缺乏正当性 
Does China own South China Sea? Historical analysis undermines the credibility of China’s 
claim 
驻外中国官员解释为何中国不应声称拥有南海主权 
Overseas Chinese governor explains why China should not declare sovereignty over South China 
Sea 
英国华人团体指出中国拒绝接受南海不利裁决「很不负责」 
Chinese community in the UK states that China is “irresponsible” in rejecting the tribunal’s 
ruling against China in South China Sea dispute 
纽约时报专题：南海争议，北京说词的误区：中国何曾拥有南海？ 
New York Times opinion: Controversies of South China Sea, fallacies in Beijing’s statement: 
Since when did China own South China Sea? 
南海不是中国的内海：中国南海政策无法理依据 
South China Sea is not China’s territorial sea: China’s South China Sea policies lacks legal basis 
美国高层领导人反对中国南海主权，吁国际沟通 
U.S. Authorities speak against China’s ownership over South China Sea, calling for international 
dialogue 
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Appendix M 
 
Articles used in Study 3 
 
Cultural Complexity Condition: 
 
每个文化都有其好跟坏的地方。请详读下文介绍中国文化中主流儒家思想的利与弊： 
 
优秀之处： 
儒家提出一系列道德范畴、命题、思想丰富了中国传统道德宝库。儒家文化属人伦文化，
它提出的仁、义、礼、智、信、温、良、恭、俭、让、忠、孝、廉、节、耻等，蕴含量十
分丰富，每个字都能写一篇大文章。如果抽象出它们的一般意义，加以选择、加工、发
挥，就能成为精华。如“仁”，是儒家道德规范体系的核心，“仁者仁也”，强调了人的
社会属性和本质；“仁者爱人”，反映了利他精神；“克己复礼为仁”，要求人应该有道
德自律意识；“杀身成仁”，彰显了坚守信念、不怕牺牲的决心。又如“忠”，抛开它的
忠君和愚忠的具体含义之外，可贵之处在于忠于职守、勇于负责，完全可以把它用在忠于
国家、忠于人民方面上。此外，“义”即正直、正义，“礼”即礼貌、礼仪，“信”即诚
信、信誉，“温”即和蔼、平易，“恭”即谦虚、敬人，“俭”即勤俭节约，“让”即宽
容忍让，“廉”即清正廉洁，“节”即骨气、气节，“耻”即自尊自爱等，它们的一般意
义都可以继承并发扬光大，为我们的个人品德、家庭美德、职业道德、社会公德建设服
务。 
 
不良之处： 
等级观念压抑了人的个性和创造性。儒家思想的核心是“仁”，“仁”的外化就是
“礼”，“礼”是儒家思想的一个特色。“礼”就是指人们在相互交往中找到自己的位
置，举止言行符合了自己的位置要求，就说明懂礼。中国历来被称为“礼义之邦”，中国
人也不乏儒雅君子，但问题就出在过分上。儒家讲君臣、父子、夫妻为“三纲”，讲“贵
贱有等，长幼有差”，如果有人违反了礼，就被视为犯上作乱。 “礼”太多，就是繁文
缛节、形式主义，最大的弊端就是压抑个性，妨碍真理发现和科学发明。由于讲“礼”，
领导、长辈说的话，即使错话，也不能越，不能顶，不能改，因而拒绝一针见血的争辩，
否则为狂妄、骄傲、“大不敬”。在西方，学生提问不用举手示意，随时插话，打断老师
讲课，属于正常；在中国就不行，孔子讲“非礼勿言，非礼勿视，非礼勿听，非礼勿
动”。如按这些“礼”来教育，即使天真烂漫、活泼可爱的青少年，也全被教育成循规蹈
矩、蹑手蹑脚、千人一面的谦谦君子；再加上孔子讲“君子讷于言，敏于行”、“巧言令
色，鲜于仁”，更限制了人们对雄辩和沟通才能的发挥。这和我们改革开放时代提出的开
拓性、创造性人才要求背道而驰。 
 
Every culture contains both positive and negative features.  Please read the following article 
discussing one positive and one negative influences of Confucianism on Chinese society. 
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Positive aspect: 
Confucianism proposes a comprehensive ethics system that enriches Chinese traditional moral 
philosophy.  Confucianism stipulates the structure of human relations, and each virtue it extols 
can be expanded into an essay (e.g., benevolence, righteousness, politeness, wisdom, 
trustworthiness, modesty, respect, frugality, thoughtfulness, filial piety, fidelity, having a sense 
of shame).  If we articulate the overarching element that underlies all these virtues, we can 
elaborate on this element and behave accordingly.  For instance, benevolence lies at the core of 
Confucian ethics; it can take on different meanings under different contexts.  Benevolence 
emphasizes the social nature of human being, reflects the value of altruism, reminds people of 
the importance of self-discipline, and highlights the necessity of holding fast to your beliefs even 
if it means scarification.  Take fidelity as another example.  In addition to its surface meaning of 
vowing loyalty to the ruler, it can also be translated into carrying out one's duties wholeheartedly 
and taking full responsibility of one's behavior.  This virtue can be applied to other areas, such as 
one’s country and the people.  Lastly, other virtues are perfectly applicable to the modern society 
and should be carried forward in order to improve ourselves, better our families, and serve the 
public. 
 
Negative aspect: 
The notion of interpersonal hierarchy suppresses individuality and creativity.  The core virtue of 
Confucianism is benevolence, which is embodied as acting appropriately and finding one’s own 
place during social interactions (propriety).  China historically has been called the nation of 
propriety, and there are plenty of people with noble characters.  However, the problem is that the 
principle of propriety can be overly strict.  Confucianism stipulates how people are supposed to 
behave in different interpersonal contexts, and underlies the need for people to respect the 
elderly and authority.  A violation of propriety can be conceived as breaking the rules and an 
attempt to insult the ruler.  Too much emphasis on propriety is equal to formalism, which 
hampers individuality, the pursue of truth, and the development of science.  Because people care 
about propriety, they dare not disagree with the elderly/leaders even if the elderly/leaders are 
wrong.  People refuse to argue with seniors out of the fear of being labeled as disrespectful or 
arrogant.  In the West, students who want to voice their opinions do not need to raise their hands, 
but this is never the case in China.  Confucius wants people to behave in accordance to propriety, 
which could strangle the liveliness of adolescents, turning them all into a rule-follower.  In 
addition, Confucius also admonishes people to be careful about their speech, haltering the 
growth of communication skills.  These all run contrary to what the modern society calls for. 
 
Control Condition: 
 
中国有山地、高原、丘陵、盆地、平原和沙漠等各类地形，地势西高东低，呈三级阶梯分
布，自西而东，逐级下降；平原少，山地多，陆地高差悬殊。山地、高原和丘陵约占陆地
面积的 67％，盆地和平原约占陆地面积的 33％。山地和高原多集中于西部地区。海拔
500公尺以下的地区仅占全国面积的 16%，海拔 1000公尺以上的高达 65%，全世界 8000
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公尺以上的 12座山峰中国就有 7座；山脉多呈东西和东北一西南走向，主要有阿尔泰
山、天山、昆仑山、喀喇昆仑山、喜马拉雅山、阴山、秦岭、南岭、大兴安岭、长白山、
太行山、武夷山和横断山等山脉，与尼泊尔交界的喜马拉雅山主峰珠穆朗玛峰，海拔
8844公尺，为世界第一高峰，位于吐鲁番盆地的艾丁湖海拔-155米为最低点。中国的四
大高原分别为青藏高原、内蒙古高原、黄土高原和云贵高原，青藏高原为最大的高原；四
大盆地分别为柴达木盆地、塔里木盆地、准噶尔盆地和四川盆地，塔里木盆地为面积最大
的盆地，柴达木盆地为最高的盆地；三大平原分别为东北平原、华北平原和长江中下游平
原，东北平原为最大的平原。荒漠主要分布于西部地区，塔克拉玛干沙漠为中国面积最大
的沙漠，也是世界最大的流动沙漠。 
 
由于疆域的宽广和地理的大跨度，中国几乎囊括了所有地形；中国陆地的河流、湖泊众
多，但它们主要属于太平洋海洋水系，这决定了水流向东的基本走向；其次为西南部部分
区域属于印度洋水系，西部部分地区存在内陆独立水系；西北部几条河流属于北冰洋水
系。河流分为外流河与和内流河，南部、东部和北部河流均为外流河，南方河流水流量
大，水位季节变化较小，汛期较长，含沙量小，无结冰期；北方除黑龙江等少数河流外，
河水的流量小，水位季节变化规汛期较短，含沙量大。内流河主要分布在西北部，塔里木
河为中国最大内流河。长江为中国第一大、世界第三大河流，黄河和珠江分别为第二和第
三大河流。中国湖泊众多，主要分布于南部和西部，五大淡水湖泊鄱阳湖、洞庭湖、太
湖、洪泽湖和巢湖均分布于长江流域；青海湖为面积最大的湖泊，也是最大的咸水湖，纳
木错为第二大咸水湖。
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